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DURATIONAL RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
FREDERIC S. LECLERCQ*
Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as for
one of your country. Leviticus 24:22.
I. INTRODUCTION
A candidate for public office encounters many barriers in
seeking election, but few are as traditional and restrictive as du-
rational residency requirements. Most states, counties, and mu-
nicipalities impose such requirements as a qualification for exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial office.I Recently, however, the con-
stitutional validity of durational residency requirements for pub-
lic office has been repeatedly questioned in the courts. Since 1970,
25 cases have been decided in the federal and state courts chal-
lenging the constitutionality of residency requirements, but these
cases probably represent only a small fraction of the instances in
which candidates for public office have been frustrated by the
conclusive presumption of incapacity imposed by the require-
ments. Some of the cases have been concerned with state dura-
tional residency requirements which impose a penalty on
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. A.B., University of South Caro-
lina, 1959; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1960; LL.B., Duke University,
1963.
1. See generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (Legislative Drafting Research
Fund of Columbia University ed. 1962). For example, 43 states currently have durational
residency requirements as conditions of eligibility for the office of governor. Twenty-nine
of these states require 5 or more years, 10 states require 7 or more years and 2 states
require 10 years. See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 n.14 (D.N.H.), aff'd
mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1974).
Forty-nine of the fifty states impose durational residency requirements upon state
legislators. The residency requirements range from 6 months to 5 years.
Durational Residency Requirement for State Representatives
5 Yr. 4 Yr. 3 Yr. 2 Yr. I Yr. 6 Mo. None
No. of States 3 2 10 11 18 5 1
See Hayes v. Gill, 52 Hawaii 251, 259, 473 P.2d 872, 878 (1970).
Durational residency requirements of from 1 to 5 years are likewise common as quali-
fications for state judicial office. See, e.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (D. Neb.
1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 968 (1971).
Counties and municipalities generally impose durational residency requirements on
candidates for public office through their corporate charters. See notes 2-9 infra.
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interstate migration, while others have involved county,
municipal, or district durational residency qualifications which
penalize intrastate migration.
Ten years ago, the New Jersey Supreme- Court became the
first court to invalidate a durational residency requirement for
public office on federal constitutional grounds.' Since 1970, such
requirements have been invalidated by state courts of last resort
five times,3 three times by federal courts of appeals. 4 five times
by federal district courts,5 and twice by three-judge federal pan-
els.' In the same five year period, however, similar requirements,
when challenged on federal constitutional grounds, have been
approved on four occasions by state courts of last resort,' once by
2. In Gangemi v. Rosengard, 44 N.J. 166, 207 A.2d 665 (1965), a 2-year residency for
Mayor of Jersey City was struck down on federal and state constitutional grounds.
3. Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal. 3d 96, 507 P.2d 628, 107 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1973) (2-year
city residency for city councilmen); Camara v. Mellon, 4 Cal. 3d 714, 484 P.2d 577, 94
Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971) (3-year city residency for city councilmen); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4
Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971) (5-year county residency for county
supervisor); Cowan v. City of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343, 509 P.2d 1269 (1973) (3-year city
residency for municipal candidates); Bird v: City of Colorado Springs, 181 Colo. 141, 507
P.2d 1099 (1973) (5-year city residency for mayor and councilmen).
4. Lehman v. City of Pittsburgh, 474 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g per curiam district
court's order of dismissal (2-year city residency for city employment); Wellford v. Battag-
lia, 343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972), af'd, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973) (5-year city
residency for mayor); Green v. McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 468
F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972) (2-year city residency for city elective or hppointive office).
5. Alexander v. Kammer, 363 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (5-year city and 2-year
district residency for city commission); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (5-year district residency for county commissioner); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343
F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972); Green v. McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mich. 1971);
Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (3-year city residency for mayor).
Cf. Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (2-year
city residency and city property ownership for city elective office); Landes v. Town of
North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1967) (city property
ownership requirement for city office).
6. Headlee v. Franklin Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (1-year
village residency required by state law for village councilmen); Mogk v. City of Detroit,
335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (3-year city residency required by state law for charter
commissioner).
7. Triano v. Massion, 109 Ariz. 506, 513 P.2d 935 (1973) (1-year ward residency for
city councilmen); Hayes v. Gill, 52 Hawaii 251, 473 P.2d 872 (1970) (3-year state residency
for members of the state House of Representatives); State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483
S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1972) (1-year district residency for state senator). Accord, Cowan v. City
of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343, 509 P.2d 1269 (1973) (1-year state residency for municipal office);
DeHond v. Nyquist, 65 Misc. 2d 526, 318 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 1971) (3-
year city residency for city board of education). Cf. Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 325
A.2d 392 (1974) (held on state grounds that the appellant does not meet the 3-year
durational residency requirement for state senator imposed by the Maryland constitu-
2
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a district court,8 and five times by three-judge federal panels.9
This large volume of litigation is perhaps a fair measure of the
importance of this question and the substantiality of the federal
claims involved. These claims are further supported by the 16
cases in which federal and state courts have granted federal relief,
and, additionally, by the stay granted by Mr. Justice Brennan in
Walker v. Yucht.10 The conflict in opinion of the lower courts over
such an urgent question should lead, in the very near future, to
plenary review of durational residency requirements by the
United States Supreme Court. Several substantial federal consti-
tutional questions are likely to be raised before the Court, and it
is those questions that are of concern here."
tion); Ravenel v. Dekle, 265 S.C. 364, 218 S.E.2d 521 (1975) (held on state grounds that
the Democratic nominee for governor does not meet the 5-year durational residency re-
quirement of the South Carolina constitution). Accord, State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, 65
N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558 (1935) (held on state grounds that Governor Moodie must surren-
der the office of governor of North Dakota to the lieutenant governor because Moodie did
not satisfy the 5-year state durational residency requirement of the North Dakota consti-
tution). But cf. Missouri ex rel. King v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1972) (held on state
grounds that the Republican nominee for governor met the 10-year durational residency
requirement of the Missouri constitution). Durational residency requirements for public
office were upheld in a number of older cases. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Dominguez, 217 Cal.
533, 20 P.2d 327 (1933), and Sheehan v. Scott, 145 Cal. 684, 79 P. 350 (1905), overruled
by Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971).
8. Lehman v. City of Pittsburgh, 474 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1973).
9. Kanapaux v. Ellisor, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 1974), afl'd mem., 419
U.S. 891 (1974) (5-year state residency for governor); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211
(D.N.H. 1973), afl'd mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1974) (7-year state residency for governor);
Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972), stay granted, (Brennan, Circuit Justice,
1972) (3-year state residency for state House of Representatives); Draper v. Phelps, 351
F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (6-month district residency for state House of Representa-
tives); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd. mem., 401 U.S. 968
(1971) (1-year circuit residency for state circuit judge).
10. 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972). The appeal was not perfected because plaintiff
was defeated in his bid for election. Telephone conversation with F. Franklin Balotti, Esq.,
in Wilmington, Del., Nov. 5, 1974.
11. A search of the literature did not disclose any articles on this topic. There are,
however, several articles examining durational residency requirements for voting. See,
e.g., Cocanower and Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 ARz L. REv. 477 (1970);
Macleod and Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil Rights, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 93 (1969); Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the
Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REv. 823 (1963); Note, State Residency Require-
ments and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 58 Kv. L.J. 300 (1970); Note, Voter
Residency Requirements in State and Local Elections, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 600 (1971); Note,
Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 359
(1970).
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I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
A. The English Experience
Durational residency requirements as a condition precedent
to holding public office are of ancient vintage. In England they
date back to 1413 when Parliament provided that its members
must have been resident "within the shire where they shall be
chosen the Day of the Date of the Writ of the Summons of the
Parliament.' 2 The durational residency requirements for public
office in early fifteenth century England are traceable to the anti-
democratic sentiment existing at the close of the Wars of the
Roses when large numbers of electors were disfranchised. 3 The
purpose of the early fifteenth century English election laws was
to restrict political participation "by the very great, outrageous
and excessive Number of People . . of small substance, and of
no value . . .[who] pretended a voice equivalent . . with the
most worthy knights and squires . ... 14 Voting was thus re-
stricted to those who had free land in the value of 40 shillings a
year above all charges. Parliamentary elections during this period
"either represented the will of the local magnate or took the form
of small battles."' 5
B. The Early American Experience
Durational residency requirements are also deeply rooted in
the American colonial experience."6 The early state constitutions
are replete with durational residency requirements for voting as
well as for seeking public office.' 7 The length of such requirements
has been affected by factors as diverse as the influence of the
frontier, changes brought by Reconstruction, hostility to immi-
gration, and, simply, antipathy to "outsiders," foreign or domes-
tic.'8
12. 1 Hen. V. c. 1. This act was confirmed and expanded in 1429 and again in 1444.
See 8 Hen. VI. c. 7 (1429) and 23 Hen. VI. c. 14 (1444).
13. G. Campion, Parliament, 17 ENcy. BRITANNICA 311, 315 (1958).
14. 1 Hen. V. c. 1.
15. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 37 (5th ed. 1956).
16. For example, South Carolina imposed durational residency requirements upon
suffrage as early as 1693. See A. McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN
ENGLISH COLONIES OF AMERICA 135-36 (1905).
17. See LeClercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation,
8 IND. L. REV. 607 (1975).
18. See generally 1-7 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS (F.
[Vol. 27850
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The purpose of durational residency requirements for public
office may generally be inferred from their effects. The records of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787-89, however, provide valu-
able insight into the advantages and disadvantages of state dura-
tional residency requirements as perceived at that time. The
rejection of state durational residency requirements as a qualifi-
cation for federal office was responsive to the emerging nationalist
interest in unrestricted interstate migration which would later be
clothed in constitutional garb as the "right to travel."' 9
1. Debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787-89
The debates at the Constitutional Convention disclose four
purposes underlying state durational residency requirements:2 1 to
require that candidates be knowledgeable of local matters, 2' to
prevent rich foreign nations from sending over their operatives
who might bribe their way into public office,22 to discourage
wealthy men from neighboring states from seeking public office
Thorpe, ed. 1906). In response to such factors, especially the diminishing influence of the
frontier, California increased its residency requirement for governor from 2 years to 5 years
in its Constitution of 1879. South Carolina, on the other hand, reflected the high value
placed by Reconstruction framers on interstate migration by reducing the previous 10-year
residency requirement to 2 years in the South Carolina Constitution of 1868. This effort
was countered in 1895, however, when the requirement was increased again to 5 years
which is the present standard.
The South Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1895:
reflected a deep hostility to outsiders marked frequent condemnations of "al-
iens" and "foreign" rascals. [W]e should guard against the possibility of this
flood, which is now dammed up, breaking loose; or, like the viper who is asleep,
only to be warmed into life again and sting us whenever some more white
rascals, native or foreign, come here and mobilize the ignorant blacks. Therefore
the only thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is to take from them every
ballot that we can under the laws of our national government.
Brief to for Appellant at 13, Kanapaux v. Ellisor, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept 26, 1974),
citing THE CONsTrruTioNAL CONVENTION OF 1895, at 463-64 (Statement of Ben Tillman).
19. As early as 1823, Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington, while riding circuit, observed
that citizens of the United States enjoy certain "privileges and immunities which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments
.. . ." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). Among
these fundamental rights was "[tihe right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise ... " Id. at 552. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969).
20. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 216-19, 235-39 (M.
FARRAND, ED. 1966) [hereinafter cited as 2 RECORDS].
21. Id. at 216 (Mr. Mason of Virginia); id. at 217 (Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina).
22. Id. at 216 (Mr. Mason of Virginia).
5
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elsewhere after having failed in their own state,2 and to close the
door on public officeholders who do not share "the wholesome
prejudices which uphold all local governments.
' 24
Significantly, state durational residency requirements were
defeated by the Constitutional Convention.25 The view prevailed
that "we were now forming a National Government and such a
regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one
people. ' 2 Moreover, the Convention substituted an "inhabi-
tancy" requirement for the "residency" requirement of the origi-
nal draft.27 The word "inhabitant" Madison argued, "would not
exclude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on
public or private business. ' 28 Madison was aware of the "[g]reat
disputes [which] had been raised in Virginia concerning the
meaning of residence as a qualification of Representatives which
were determined more according to the affection or dislike to the
man in question, than to any fixed interpretation of the word."
'
One of the most convincing arguments against durational
residency requirements as a qualification for holding public office
was the political argument offered by Mr. Morris:
23. Id. at 218 (Mr. Mason of Virginia). This was alleged to be "the practice in the
boroughs of England." Id. For a treatment of the rotten borough system in England under
which wealthy nonresidents, in effect, purchased office from isolated districts, see, e.g.,
CANNON, PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, 1640-1832 (1972) and PORRrTT, THE UNREFORMED HOUSE
OF COMMONS (1903). The Founding Fathers understandably viewed with apprehension the
British system under which
representation had long become an illusion. The knights of the shire were the
nominees of nobles and great landowners; the borough members were returned
by the crown, by noble patrons or close corporations. . . . [A]fter the Restora-
tion, the infamous system of bribing the members themselves became a recog-
nized instrument of administration.
G. Campion, Parliament, 17 ENCy. BRITANNICA 316 (1958).
24. 2 RECORDS, supra note 20, at 238 (Mr. Morris of Massachusetts). Mr. Butler of
South Carolina was apprehensive of "[foreigners'] ideas of Gov't so distinct from ours
that in every point of view they are dangerous." Id. at 236.
25, A 3-year state durational residency requirement was defeated by a 9-2 vote and
a 1-year requirement by a 6-4 vote (1 divided). Id. at 219.
26. 2 RECORDS, supra note 20, at 217 (Mr. Read of Delaware).
27. The original draft read:
ART. IV, SECT. 2. "Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of
the age of twenty-five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United
States for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of
his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be chosen."
Id, at 216 n.3. (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 217.
29. Id. Mr. Morris observed that great disputes had been initiated in New York by
residency requirements and Mr. Mercer "mentioned instances of violent disputes raised
in Maryland concerning the term 'residence.'" Id.
[Vol. 27
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[S]uch a regulation is not necessary. People rarely choose a
nonresident-It is improper as in the first branch, the people at
large, not the States are represented."
Mr. Mercer of Maryland made two formidable arguments against
state durational residency requirements as a qualification for
holding federal office:
Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among
the States than existed under the old federal system. It would
interweave local prejudices and State distinctions in the very
Constitution which is meant to cure them."
Mr. Mercer also responded to the "knowledgeable candidate"
rationale frequently advanced by residency requirement advo-
cates.
It would certainly exclude men, who had once been inhabit-
ants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their
original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge
could not in such case be presumed.
32
Mr. Williamson of North Carolina argued against "requiring any
period of previous residence . . . [because] [n]ew residents if
elected will be most zealous to conform to the will of their constit-
uents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye. 33
A 14 year durational citizenship requirement for senatorial
candidates, proposed by Mr. Morris and seconded by Mr. Pinck-
ney, was opposed by Mr. Elseworth "as discouraging meritorious
aliens from emigrating to this country."34 Madison also responded
to the argument that durational residency requirements were nec-
essary to prevent outside economic or political interests from
sending over their emissaries who might bribe their way into pub-
lic office stating that the bribes of strangers "would be expended
on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jeal-
30. Id. (emphasis in original). In a similar vein, during debate on senatorial qualifica-
tions, Mr. Williamson argued for a longer residency requirement for Senators than for
Representatives because "Bribery and Cabal can be more easily practiced in the choice
of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of
the House of Representatives who will be chosen by the people." Id. at 239.
31. Id. at 217.
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 235. Mr. Madison reasoned that the Morris proposal would "give a tincture
of illiberality to the Constitution" and would discourage "respectable Europeans .. .
[fromi transferring] their fortunes hither." Id. at 235-36.
1976]
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ousy and watchfulness in the public."" Mr. Wilson of Pennsyl-
vania, alluding to his nonnative status, attacked durational resi-
dency requirements as a "degrading discrimination" which heap
"discouragement and mortification" upon "meritorious foreign-
ers." The Convention inserted the term "inhabitant" in lieu of
"resident" in an effort to avoid squabbles over eligibility for fed-
eral office, 37 and defeated efforts to adopt state durational resi-
dency requirements for federal office."
Thus, from the early days of the nation, federal practice has
diverged sharply from state practice. State durational residency
requirements have generally been a requirement for holding any
major state public office, even though such requirements were
deliberately rejected by the Founding Fathers for federal office-
holders. There is an important distinction between state
durational residency requirements and the federal constitution's
durational United States citizenship requirements for President,
Vice President, Senator, and Representatives. Durational United
States citizenship requirements do not restrict the right of domes-
tic travel; conversely, state and local durational residency re-
quirements serve to penalize the rights of interstate and intras-
tate travel of persons with political aspirations.
Durational residency requirements penalize mobility and
reinforce parochial perspectives. At the Federal Constitutional
Convention there was evidence of special affection for lengthy
durational residency requirements held by Deep South slave-
state delegates such as Rutledge and Butler of South Carolina.
This suggests that length of residency may have served to pro-
mote acquiescence of public officeholders to the status quo inter-
ests of a slave-holding, plantation society. A twentieth century
analogue of the "peculiar institution" justification of state dura-
tional residency requirements for public office can easily be fash-
ioned in the political context of the post-Brown8" era in the
South.
However, the prevalence of state durational residency re-
quirements throughout the Union suggests the need for a more
35. Id. at 236.
36. Id. at 237. He recalled that on "his removal into Maryland, he found himself, from
defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities, which never ceased to produce
chagrin. .. ."
37. Id. at 239.
38. See note 26 supra.
38.1. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
854 [Vol. 27
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universal explanation. The most plausible explanation is proba-
bly best expressed as follows: lengthy state durational residency
requirements were favored most strongly by those with the slight-
est attachments to a national union. Such requirements have
always accentuated tendencies destructive of the "more perfect
union" which the Constitution was drafted to form. State dura-
tional residency requirements are most consistent with a "league-
of-separate-nations" view of the federal union. Pressed to the
extreme, state durational residency requirements reflect xeno-
phobic tendencies, out of spirit with the idea of national union.
Political units dominated by parochial interests have relied upon
durational residency requirements to diminish advocacy of "dif-
ferent" or "foreign" ideas. The assumption here is that those who
live in a place long enough will either espouse or, at the very least,
tolerate its local political myths. Those who never travel are less
likely to challenge commonly accepted myths.
Mobility in our society was a characteristic chiefly of the
frontier. Consequently, frontier settlers whittled away at lengthy
durational residency requirements. As frontier states became
more settled, the emergence of parochial interests comparable to
those which had existed in other states often manifested them-
selves in the lengthening of state durational residency require-
ments for public office. So long as interstate migration was an
exceptional circumstance in the life of most families, durational
residency requirements were politically tolerable. That is, there
were too few people adversely affected by them to raise a substan-
tial question.
County, municipal, and district durational residency re-
quirements were patterned on the state models. Their length var-
ies greatly and may reflect the role of imitation in the adoption
of charters as much as negative attitudes toward mobility.
2. A Teleology from Recent Cases
The two-member majority of the three-judge district court in
Hadnott v. Amos 9 (Hadnott II) declared that Alabama had a
compelling state interest in imposing a durational residency re-
quirement on candidates for circuit judge. 9 .1 It was declared to
39. 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 968 (1971).
39.1. Judge Johnson considered the court's arguments "superficial." Id. at 128 (John-
son, J., dissenting in part).
197%]
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be of "urgent importance that the voter have an opportunity to
observe, learn about and appraise" candidates for office.4" After
a recitation of some of the "innumerable qualities and qualifica-
tions that are relevant," the court emphasized the "particular
significance of exposure by residence" in rural, sparsely popu-
lated areas.4' The court surmised that our democracy may be
sufficiently strong to withstand the strain of a few voters not
qualified by residency requirements, but that when the
candidates, as a result of brief residency, were not exposed to the
voters, a much more serious threat occurs.42 In a dissenting opin-
ion in Thompson v. Mellon,43 Judge Burke of the California Su-
preme Court emphasized an important variation on the voter
exposure rationale of Hadnott I-that durational residency laws
are valid because they "provide the only opportunity for voter-
candidate contact in a noncampaign atmosphere."4
Proponents of state durational residency requirements at the
Federal Convention of 1787-89 feared that, without such require-
ments, "rotten boroughs" would flourish in this country as they
had in England. The contemporary analogue of the "rotten bor-
ough" rationale is the "carpetbagger" justification as expressed
in Draper v. Phelps:4 '
Absent a durational residency requirement "carpetbagger" can-
didates who have no desire as agents or representatives of the
district, genuinely to acquaint themselves with the problems of
a representative district and conscientiously strive for the solu-
tion thereof in the legislative halls, can be candidates. 5
40. Id. at 120.
41. Id. at 121. In the judicial circuit from which petitioner sought to be qualified as
a candidate for judge, the
three counties are rural and sparsely populated. There is no television station
in the circuit, one radio station, no daily newspaper. Necessarily conmunication
between candidate and voter is personal and personalized. Information which
under other circumstances might be communicated by more formal means nec-
essarily is communicated informally by personal acquaintance and observation,
by word of mouth from neighbor to neighbor. The voters acquire general com-
munity knowledge about the candidate, while at the same time the candidate
builds a community reputation concerning many of the traits to which we above
referred. These are processes which cannot operate overnight. But they repre-
sent appropriate functioning of democracy.
Id. Compare id. at 130 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part).
42. Id. at 121-22.
43. 9 Cal. 3d at 112, 507 P.2d at 640, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (1973).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
44.1. 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
45. Id. at 683.
[Vol. 27
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Another asserted state interest served by durational resi-
dency requirements for public office is the policy "that those who
expect to stand for the office of state representative take the
matter seriously and make plans for their candidacy in advance
of the election date."46 It has also been suggested that the state
has an interest in securing public officers who have "more at
stake in doing a good job," presumably because of their past ties
with the community.4 7 Durational residency requirements for
public office have also been recognized as a "built-in device to
prevent competition against the. . . oldtimers. "48 although
this hardly justifies their continued use.
The role of imitation was probably a very substantial factor
in the adoption of durational residency requirements for public
office. Thus, when proposals were made to eliminate or reduce the
state durational residency requirements for public office at the
Hawaii State Constitutional Convention of 1968, the require-
ments were retained in accordance with the committee recom-
mendation that "residency requirements, too, are important; all
states include such provisions in their constitutions."49 When one
considers that the committees drafting proposed constitutions for
each of the new states admitted into the Union probably began
their work with a study of the constitutions of the other states,
the probable force of imitation as an explanation of durational
residency requirements for public office gains momentum. For
example, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 "was modeled
almost entirely after the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, '"'
from whence the New Hampshire 7-year durational residency
requirement for governor issued full grown. Thus, electicism may
explain the proliferation of durational residency requirements for
public office more adequately than reasoned decisionmaking.
Constitutional provisions, like bureaucratic systems, once cre-
ated, often acquire a life of their own and thrive independently
of their reasons for being.
Once adopted, the role of tradition has been important in the
46. Id.
47. Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 146 n.5 (D. Del. 1972).
48. Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 722, 484 P.2d 581, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971).
49. Hayes v. Gill, 52 Hawaii 251, 258, 473 P.2d 872, 877 (1970). Thus, the Hawaii
Supreme Court was impressed that its "examination of state laws shows that every state,
except Nevada, has residency requirement[s] of varying length." Id.
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maintenance of state durational requirements for public office. 51
The presumption of constitutionality and judicial restraint have
also played an important part in the maintenance of state dura-
tional residency requirements.
52
In recapitulation, durational residency requirements for
state public offices are as old as the Union itself, finding justifica-
tion upon a multitude of diverse grounds. The traditional
justifications for such requirements have been:
(1) knowledgeable candidates-the need for a knowledgeable
candidate to ensure the awareness and responsiveness of candi-
dates to local problems.
(2) exposure-exposure of the candidate to the voters to in-
crease the opportunity for voters to acquire personal knowledge
about the candidate, his experience, maturity, sensitivity, cour-
tesy, family life, business affairs and social philosophy. Al-
though generally conceived in a campaign context, the voter-
exposure rationale has also been extended to apply to voter-
candidate contact in a precampaign context.
(3) serious candidates-the need to prevent frivolous candi-
dates from filing for office and to encourage advance planning
and preparation for political candidacy.
(4) direct personal interest-the need to encourage candidates
with substantial ties to the community and to restrict decision-
making to those directly affected by such decisions.
(5) rotten borough-the need to prevent wealthy men or "car-
petbaggers" from migrating to the state to seek public office.
(6) parochialism-the need to protect the wholesome local
prejudices of local government.
(7) status quo-the need to minimize competition against the
political oldtimers.
(8) imitation-a compulsion to defer to the traditions of other
states which is often reinforced by procedural mechanisms and
judicial attitudes of restraint.
51. Id. The court observed that "something more than disappointment of one frus-
trated candidate is needed to erase a constitutional provision that goes back to 1784 and
was never challenged until now." See also DeHond v. Nyquist, 65 Misc. 526, 318 N.Y.S.2d
650 (Sup, Ct. Albany Cty. 1971), where the court was apparently influenced in part by
the fact that "[r]esidence has been a traditional qualification for holding public office
in New York." (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., DeHond v. Nyquist, 65 Misc. 2d 526,318 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. Albany
Cty. 1971), and Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. The Right of Political Participation
Until recently, durational residency requirements for voting
constituted "the single greatest impediment to voting by those
desiring to do so."5 The American Heritage Foundation system-
atically analyzed the causes of nonvoting in several recent presi-
dential and congressional elections and estimated that 8 million
of the 104 million citizens of voting age in 1960 were mobile adults
disqualified by state, county or precinct residency requirements."
Responding to the obvious inequities of denying the vote to
mobile adults in federal elections, Congress, in the Voting Rights
Act of 1970,11 abolished state durational residency requirements
of greater than 30 days for voting in all federal elections. Congress
found that the imposition of durational residency requirements in
federal elections:
(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citi-
zens to vote... ;
(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citi-
zens to enjoy their free movement across State lines;
(3) denies or abridges the privileges or immunities guaranteed
to the citizens of each state... ;
(4) in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect
of denying citizens the right to vote for such officers because of
the way they may vote;
(5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil
rights, and due process and equal protection of the laws that are
guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(6) does not bear a relationship to any compelling State inter-
est in the conduct of presidential elections.58
The United States Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Mitchell,7 up-
held the constitutionality of such federal restrictions on state
53. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile
Society, 61 MICH. L. REv. 823, 829 (1963).
The emerging, federally secured right of political participation has been considered
at some length in another article. See LeClercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right
of Political Participation, 8 IND. L. Rzv. 607 (1975).
54. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile
Society, 61 MicH. L. REv. 823, 829 (1963).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-l(a) through (i)(1974).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(1974).
57. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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durational residency requirements for voting in national elections
and set the stage for a series of decisions establishing the parame-
ters for similar restrictions. In Dunn v. Blumstein,5 the Court, on
equal protection grounds, invalidated the Tennessee durational
residency requirement of one year in the state and three months
in the county as a prerequisite to voting in state elections. Find-
ing support in the congressional findings of fact in the Voting
Right Act of 1970,11 the Court observed that "30 days appears to
be an ample period of time for the state to complete whatever
administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud-and a year,
or three months, too much."6 In two more recent companion
cases, Burns v. Fortson6 and Marston v. Lewis,62 the Court
stripped the 30-day requirement of its talismanic effect and ap-
proved Arizona and Georgia requirements that voters be regis-
tered for 50 days prior to an" election. In Burns the Court declared
that "the 50-day registration period approaches the outer consti-
tutional limits.
'63
The decisions in Burns and Marston have clouded the issue
apparently resolved by the dicta in Dunn which appeared to es-
tablish the maximum permissible limit of state durational resi-
dency requirements for voting. To date, the maximum length a
durational residency requirement can be validly imposed as a
precondition to voting has not been determined. The Court's rea-
soning in Dunn was more persuasive: "There is no reason to think
that what Congress thought was unnecessary to prevent fraud in
presidential elections should not also be unnecessary in the con-
text of other elections."" The interest in the certainty of a 30-day
maximum seems far more substantial than the marginal value of
additional time. Indeed, the administrative burden of maintain-
ing two separate standards-one for state or local and one for
federal elections-would appear to justify a 30-day maximum
from a logic of efficiency, absent some compelling state interest
58. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
59. Id. at 348 n.19.
60. Id. at 348 (dicta). Contra, Dreuding v. Devlin, 235 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Md.
1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). Dunn effectively overruled Dreuding.
61. 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
62. 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
63. Id. at 687. Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan dissented in both decisions.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result but indicated his dissatisfaction with a
constitutionally imposed "arbitrary number of days figure." Id. at 688.
64. 405 U.S. at 348 n.19.
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to the contrary. Of course, it is quite different for Congress to
legislate a 30-day maximum than for the Court to impose such a
maximum on constitutional grounds. Congress, of course, can
alter its 30-day maximum at any time or for any reason when it
appears politically expedient. It would be embarrassing for the
Court, on the other hand, to retreat from a line constitutionally
imposed. Although stare decisis does not apply with the same
force to constitutional questions, we nonetheless expect, and have
a right to expect, substantial predictability with regard to consti-
tutional dispositions. Generally, the limitation of a decision to
the precise issue or facts before the Court avoids locking the Court
in on questions where future cases may require flexibility to effect
a satisfactory result. However, in the instance of durational resi-
dency requirements for voting, the certainty of a constitutionally
approved maximum-be it 30 days or some other figure-has
great appeal. Otherwise, some state and local governments may
be tempted to take a position just beyond a recently approved
maximum. Unfortunately, neither Burns nor Marston established
the outer limit; they only settled that 50 days approaches the
outer limit.
Strict scrutiny of durational residency requirements for vot-
ing is appropriate whether we look to "the benefit withheld by the
classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for the classifi-
cation (recent interstate travel).""5 Dunn emphasized that a "citi-
zen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdic-
tion."6 Dunn applied the standard of review established by
Williams v. Rhodes:
67
[W]e look, in essence, to three things: the character of the
classification in question; the individual interests affected by
the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in
support of the classification."6
The Court reiterated that an "appropriately defined and uni-
formly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be neces-
sary to preserve the basic conception of a political community,
and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny."69
65. Id. at 335.
66. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
67. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
68. 405 U.S. at 335.
69. Id. at 343-44.
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"To prevent dual voting, [states] simply have to cross-check
lists of new registrants with their former jurisdictions."70 The
Court took judicial notice that "[o]bjective information tend-
ered as relevant to the question of bona fide residence. . places
of dwelling, occupation, car registration, driver's license, property
owned, etc.-is easy to doublecheck, especially in light of modern
communications."
71
The Court turned the two separate waiting periods of state
and county residence against the state by arguing that if 3
months is enough time for the state to determine bona fide resi-
dence in the county, a 1-year period could not be "'necessary' to
fulfill the pertinent state objective. ' 72 Moreover, the job of detect-
ing nonresidents who have registered is "a relatively simple one"
and "hardly justifies prohibiting all newcomers from voting for
even three months." 73 The maximum constitutionally permissible
durational residency requirement for voting is, thus, apparently
somewhere between the 3-months intrastate requirement disap-
proved in Dunn and the 50-day requirement approved in Marston
and Burns.
The state administrative interest in the prevention of fraud
in voting is served by "a variety of criminal laws that are more
than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be
feared. ' ' 7 The prevention-of-fraud rationale would not appear
relevant as applied to political candidacy because of the much
greater public visibility of the candidate than the individual
voter. Moreover, the states' burden of establishing bona fide resi-
dence of candidates for public office is far less formidable than
the states' burden of establishing bona fide residence of voters,
simply because of the limited numbers of persons who are candi-
dates for public office.'
The Court admits that durational residency requirements
"in a crude way, exclude nonresidents . . . . 75 But they also
exclude many residents and, given the individual interests which
are affected and the states' purpose, the "classification is all too
imprecise. 7 This argument applies with equal force to political
70. Id. at 348.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 347.
73. Id. at 348.
74. Id. at 353.
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candidacy as to voting. What justification can be offered for ex-
cluding seemingly interested and informed residents from candi-
dacy for public office? Durational residency requirements for
public office, like the property restriction on voting in Kramer v.
Union Free School District77 paint with too wide a brush. Such
requirements permit political participation by many persons they
are intended to exclude and they exclude many persons who sat-
isfy the purpose of the requirements.
Dunn provides the strongest possible collateral authority
that lengthy durational residency requirements for public office
violate the equal protection clause. Such requirements for public
office plainly restrict the right to vote. The voter is effectively
denied the right to choose candidates who do not satisfy the ap-
plicable durational residency requirements. Because mobility
may often be associated with differences in social and political
perspective, the result is to deprive the entire electorate of the
opportunity to vote for someone whose values and policy perspec-
tives may have been influenced by recent travel.
States clearly have the right to limit political candidacy, as
well as the suffrage, to bona fide residents.7" However, lengthy
durational residency requirements for public office bear no rea-
sonable relationship to bona fide residence. These requirements
capriciously divide bona fide residents into two discrete groups
based upon the recency of their inhabitancy. A durational resi-
dency requirement invidiously discriminates against some bona
fide residents upon the recency of interstate travel and arbitrarily
fences off a portion of the electorate for whom voters cannot cast
their ballots. Bona fide residents who have recently migrated to
a state, county or city have an equal stake in future decisionmak-
ing. By excluding recent migrants from public office, durational
residency requirements fail to satisfy the equal protection test of
Kramer that all those excluded by a statute be less interested or
affected than those included. A durational residency requirement
is not necessary to prevent absentee officeholding-a residency
requirement is sufficient.
Durational residency requirements do not advance the state
interest in limiting public office to those who have special knowl-
77. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The New York statute in Kramer limited franchise in certain
school districts to owners or lessees of taxable realty (or their spouses) and parents or
guardians of children in public schools.
78. Id. at 625.
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edge, awareness, or responsiveness regarding local problems. The
requirements do not prevent election or appointment of persons
who have been continuous residents of a state or community for
their entire lives but are appallingly insensitive to or ignorant of
community problems. At the same time, durational residency
requirements for public office deprive voters of their right to vote
for bona fide residents who have both a sophisticated understand-
ing of local problems and a strong sense of social responsibility.
The absurdity of lengthy durational residency requirements is
nowhere more plainly evident than in the case of local residents
who leave the state to obtain an education or pursue a livelihood
and later return only to find themselves barred from seeking pub-
lic office by lengthy durational residency requirements. Dura-
tional residency requirements for public office are overbroad in
that they deny voters the opportunity to select recent migrants
who may possess special skill, knowledge or understanding. The
requirements conclusively disqualify some of the most knowl-
edgeable and highly qualified members of the electorate-
teachers, students, lawyers, clergymen, corporate executives
and other highly mobile occupational groups. Fencing off such
persons and restricting the right of the electorate to vote for
them is a substantial dilution of the right to vote which bears no
rational relationship to the legitimate state interest in promoting
local knowledge and responsiveness among its public officers. To
require a period of residence "sufficiently lengthy to impress upon
its voters the local viewpoint" is "precisely the sort of argument
. . . [the] Court has repeatedly rejected."79 This argument ap-
plies with equal force to candidacy and voting.
The congressional findings in the Voting Rights Act of 19701
provide impressive collateral support for invalidating durational
residency requirements for public office seekers in view of the
overlapping nature of the rights of political association and vot-
ing. If the direct imposition of lengthy durational residency re-
quirements upon voters is constitutionally impermissible, it is
difficult to build a strong case for restricting access to public
office by such requirements or diluting the derivative rights of
voters to cast ballots for candidates of their choice.
79. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-55 (1972). Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 95 (1965).
80. See note 56 and accompanying text, supra.
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Williams established that the "number of voters in favor of
a party. . is relevant in considering whether state laws violate
the Equal Protection Clause.""1 The substantial adverse impact
of durational residency requirements on voters has been plainly
demonstrated. Jesse Walker won the Republican primary for
state representative in Delaware despite the fact that he did not
meet the 3-year durational residency requirement. 2 Charles Rav-
enel won the 1974 Democratic primary election for governor of
South Carolina and carried more than 187,000 votes, only to be
disqualified by the state supreme court for failure to meet the 5-
year durational residency requirement for governor.8 An Ohio
plaintiff was elected to a seat on her village council following a
consent order that her name be placed on the ballot pending
resolution of her challenge to the constitutionality of a 1-year
durational residency requirement. 4
Attempts have occasionally been made to distinguish office-
holding from voting and to contend that the right to seek public
office is less fundamental than the right to vote. 5 The Court
observed in Bullock v. Carter"5 that "not every limitation or inci-
dental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a
stringent standard of review. 87 In approaching candidate restric-
tions, the Court examines "the extent and nature of their impact
on voters. 88 The right to be a candidate is an important concept
regardless of whether it originates in candidates or is derived
indirectly from the impact of candidate restrictions on voters. In
Williams, Bullock and later in Lubin v. Panish,9 however, it was
established that candidacy restrictions may be subject to judicial
scrutiny for their impact on candidates and voters. Since the
81. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968).
82. See Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Del. 1972).
83. See notes 215-24 and accompanying text infra.
84. See Headlee v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ohio
1973).
85. The State of Georgia made this argument in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362
(1970). Some courts have accepted this line of reasoning. See, e.g., Chimento v. Stark,
353 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (D.N.H. 1973); Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677, 682 (W.D.
Okla. 1972); Hayes v. Gill, 52 Hawaii 251, 259, 473 P.2d 872, 879 (1970); State ex rel.
Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70, 75-76 (Mo. 1972). But see, Alexander v. Kammer, 363
F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Mich. 1973), and the cases cited therein.
86. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
87. Id. at 143.
88. Id.
89. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
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voter hopes "to find on the ballot a candidate who comes near to
reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues,"9 laws
which substantially restrict voters' preferences are suspect. Like-
wise, state practices impinging upon the first amendment's right
of association-a candidate right-may, when the infringement
is sufficient, be subject to strict scrutiny.91
The idea that durational residency requirements for public
office are necessary to assure voter exposure presents insuperable
constitutional deficiencies. In most elections, substantial por-
tions of the electorate are never personally associated with candi-
dates for public office. One can also question the value to the
voter of minimal candidate contact derived through "pressing the
flesh." The "voter exposure" rationale is overbroad in that the
voter will not have personal contact with many candidates who
have always lived in his state or city, and, conversely, in that the
voter may have personal contact with some candidates who do
not satisfy lengthy durational residency requirements.
The "parochialism" and "pro-establishment" arguments for
durational residency requirements for public office are virtually
self-refuting. Carrington v. Rash 2 effectively prevents states from
protecting the "wholesome prejudices of local government" or
"minimizing competition for oldtimers" by "fencing out" persons
who may vote, or, by inference, conduct public offices, in a partic-
ular fashion.
The most offensive aspect of durational residency require-
ments for public office, however, is the artificial, undemocratic
restrictions such requirements impose upon the political process.
Implicit in such requirements is the assumption that the voters
are incapable of exercising proper judgment in the selection of
public officers. Durational residency requirements are "'too
crude' and the price simply too high in terms of the number of
otherwise qualified candidates excluded."93 As Judge Stapleton of
Delaware wisely observed: "Reliance must be placed on the cor-
nerstone of representative government, the collective judgment of
the electorate, rather than on a legislative solution which sub-
stantially restricts that electorate in its choice of leadership."94
90. Id. at 716.
91. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972).
92. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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B. The Right to Travel
The right to travel from one state to another . . . occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is
a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recog-
nized. . . . [T]he right finds no explicit mention in the Consti-
tution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger union the Constitution created.5
The importance of the right to travel was impressed upon the
colonists as a part of our British legacy. It is implicit in Locke's
state of nature which was "a state of perfect freedom . . . [in
which people] order their actions and dispose of their . . . per-
sons as they think fit ... -96 Likewise, for Blackstone, personal
liberty consisted in
the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's
person to whatever place one's own inclination may direct, with-
out imprisonment or restraint. . . .Y
The respect accorded the right to travel by the courts, therefore,
far antedates the Constitution itself.
The debates at the Constitutional Convention strongly sup-
port the claim that the right to travel was, in fact, considered by
the framers to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger union
the Constitution created. The Supreme Court has not attempted
to ascribe the "right to travel interstate to a particular constitu-
tional provision.""8 In Shapiro v. Thompson99 the Court held that
states could not fence out recently migrated indigents from access
95. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
96. J. LOCKE, Of the State of Nature, in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 530 (F.
Coker ed. 1942). The influence of John Locke on American political philosophy and consti-
tutional history is well established. See, e.g., C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1942).
97. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, ComhiENTARms *134 (Wendell ed. 1847) (emphasis added). Cf.
Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 652 (1609). Blackstone's lectures, originally delivered in
1753, have had an enormous influence on our constitutional history because they arrived
at a critical psychological moment. The literature is replete with authority of the influence
of Blackstone on the Founding Fathers. See, e.g., W. Holdsworth, Aspects of Bfackstone
and his Commentaries, 4 CAMB. L.J. 261 (1932). Sixteen of the original subscribers to the
first American edition of BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIES afterwards became signers of the
Declaration of Independence and six were members of the Constitution Convention. D.
LOCKMILLER, SIR WILuAM BLACKSTONE 170 (1938).
98. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1968).
99. 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
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to welfare benefits through 1-year durational residency require-
ments. The Shapiro majority observed that "in moving from
State to State . . .appellees were exercising a constitutional
right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.' ' 0
In Dunn v. Blumstein'0' the Court grounded its decision in-
validating durational residency requirements for voting upon the
right to travel as well as the right to vote. °0 Tennessee's dura-
tional residency laws, according to the Court, "classify bona fide
residents on the basis of recent travel, penalizing those persons,
who have gone from one jurisdiction to another during the quali-
fying period."'0 3 The Court found that "the durational residency
requirement directly impinges on exercise of a. . .fundamental
personal right, the right to travel."'' 4 Again, in Oregon v.
Mitchell,' 5 the Court held that the "[f]reedom to travel from
State to State-freedom to enter and abide in any State in the
Union-is a privilege of United States citizenship."' 6 In invalida-
ting an intrastate Tennessee durational residency requirement of
3-months for voting, the Dunn Court secured important political
rights for intrastate as well as interstate movers. Intrastate mi-
gration from San Diego or San Francisco to Los Angeles is equally
deserving of constitutional protection vis-a-vis political partici-
pation as interstate migration from Atlanta or New York to Los
Angeles.
To infringe upon the constitutionally protected right to
travel it is not necessary to show that a particular law "actually
deterred travel."'0 7 Shapiro explicitly states that only compelling
state interests could justify "any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right [to travel]. . .... " Thus, it
is the penalty on the exercise of the right to travel rather than
100. Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
101. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
102. Id. at 338-39. Durational residency laws "single out the class of bona fide state
and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected right, and
penalize such travelers directly." Id. at 338.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
106. Id. at 285.
107. 405 U.S. at 340.
108. 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added).
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actual deterrence of travel which offends the constitutionally pro-
tected right. Durational residency requirements for public office
permit travel, but only at a price; candidacy for public office is
prohibited. The right to travel is penalized while the right to seek
public office-a first amendment right of association-is abso-
lutely denied. Shapiro accepted the premise already established
by the Court:
that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise
a right guaranteed by the Constitution . . . . 'Constitutional
rights would be of little value if they could be . . . indirectly
denied .... '109
Relying upon Shapiro, the Court stated in Dunn that the right
to travel is an" . . . unconditional personal right; a right whose
exercise may not be conditioned." 110
The effect of durational residency requirements for public
office is the same as the effect of durational residency require-
ments for voting struck down in Dunn. Such laws force persons
who wish to travel and change residences to choose between travel
and their rights of voting and association. Just as the states may
not force citizens to choose between travel and voting, so should
states be powerless to force citizens to choose between travel and
candidacy for public office.
Durational residency requirements in some circumstances
may be justified."1 However, in Vlandis v. Kline,"' the Court
invalidated a permanent, irrebutable presumption of nonresi-
dency of any married person who applied for admission to a state
college from out of state or any unmarried person who had a legal
address for any part of the 1-year period immediately prior to
application. Such a durational residency requirement erects an
absolute bar to candidacy. A conclusive presumption is equally
offensive as applied to candidacy as to payment of tuition. The
Court relied primarily upon the authority of cases such as Bell v.
Burson"3 and Stanley v. Illinois,"4 but recognized that a "statu-
109. Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965).
110. 405 U.S. at 341.
111. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem.,
401 U.S. 985 (1971), where a durational residency requirement of 1 year was upheld as a
condition of qualifying as a resident for tuition purposes.
112. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
113. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
114. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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tory scheme [which] operates to apportion tuition rates on the
basis of old and new residence . . . [would] give rise to grave
problems under the Equal Protection Clause . "15... 15
More recently, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,"'
the Court invalidated an Arizona statute requiring a year's resi-
dence in a county as a condition of nonemergency hospitalization
or medical care at county expense. The Court reasoned that im-
portance of the benefit deprived by exercise of the right to travel
is relevant to the constitutionality of the deprivation."' While the
right to seek public office is not as basic to life as the need of
indigents for medical attention or welfare assistance, it is a
fundamental right nonetheless. Moreover, the Court, for good
reason, has shown considerably less reluctance to overturn state
legislation impinging upon political rights than upon state fiscal
policies."' Judicial deference to state allocations of scarce eco-
nomic resources is far more easily justified than deference to state
legislation intruding upon fundamental political rights. Thus,
whatever the "ultimate parameters of Shapiro penalty analy-
sis,""' its applicability to deprivations of fundamental constitu-
tional rights is well settled.
In the latest right to travel case, Sosna v. Iowa, 20 the Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Iowa 1-year dura-
tional residency requirement for divorce. Mr. Justice Rhenquist,
writing for a six member Court, distinguished Shapiro, Dunn and
Maricopa County as cases where state "budgetary or record keep-
ing considerations . . . were held insufficient to outweigh the
constitutional claims of the individuals.'12 1 According to the
115. 412 U.S. at 450 n.6.
116. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
117. Id. at 259. The Court observed that "medical care is as much 'a basic necessity
of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits
necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional
significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements." Id.
118. Compare, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), with Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971) and San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
119. 415 U.S. at 259. The Court reiterated that "the Shapiro Court cautioned that it
meant to 'imply no view of the validity of waiting period or residence requirements deter-
mining eligibility [inter alia] to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt, or fish,
or so forth.'" Id. at 259 n.13.
120. 419 U.S. 393 (1974).
121. Id. at 406. Justice White dissented on the ground that once the appellant satis-
fied the residency requirement about which the complaint was originally made, the case
was moot in that it did not satisfy the threshhold case or controversy requirement of
[Vol. 27
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Court, Iowa's interest in "avoiding officious intermeddling in
matters in which another State has a paramount interest, and in
minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collat-
eral attack" outweigh the individual interest in divorce on de-
mand virtually upon arrival in the state.'22 The Sosna court nar-
rowly read Boddie v. Connecticut 122"' as applying to claims of total
deprivation of access to the courts, and not merely to claims of
delay.
Sosna can be distinguished from cases involving durational
residency requirements for voting or political candidacy. State
regulation of domestic relations has long been regarded "as a
virtually exclusive province of the States."' s In contrast, individ-
ual access to the political process touches upon vital, national
interests and, since the early 1960's, has been subject to close
judicial scrutiny for conformity with constitutional guarantees.
Durational residency requirements for public office cannot be
justified by any state interest as substantial as the legitimate
state interests in protecting its courts from becoming mills for
"quickie" divorces and in minimizing the susceptibility of its
divorce decrees to collateral attack. Nonetheless, the "delay-not-
total-deprivation" rationale of Sosna is disturbing. Total depriva-
tion was not involved in Shapiro or Dunn-only delay. In both
Shapiro and Dunn the soughtafter privilege could be enjoyed fol-
lowing the delay which attended a 1-year durational residency
requirement. The "mere delay" apologia of Sosna unnecessarily
confused the Court's holding. The state interests in preventing its
courts from becoming mills for "quickie" divorces and in dimin-
ishing the probability of collateral attack on its divorce decrees
ostensibly justify the Court's holding.
It is too early to determine whether Sosna's substitution of
an ad hoc balancing test for the compelling interest standard
recently employed in right to travel cases justifies the concern of
Justices Marshall and Brennan, over the implications of the ma-
jority's analyses" . . . for durational residency requirement cases
Article III. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the ground that "the right to
obtain a divorce is of sufficient importance that its denial to recent immigrants constitutes
a penalty on interstate travel." Id. at 419.
122. Id. at 407.
122.1. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
123. 419 U.S. at 404. But cf. id. at 420 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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in general." '24 Although it is difficult to accept the proposition
that political rights are more fundamental than marital
rights-one possible basis for distinguishing Sosna from other
recent right to travel cases-Sosna involved substantial, counter-
vailing state interests not present in Shapiro, Dunn or Maricopa
County. The threatened subversion of the divorce laws of the
several states by the divorce-mill policies of the most lenient
states would be inconsistent with the state autonomy and diver-
sity a federal system permits in matters primarily of state and
local concern.
Lengthy durational residency requirements for public office
are also inconsistent with the geographic mobility of the nation's
population. We have become a nation of movers.2 5 About one-
fifth of the nation's population moves each year,'26 amounting to
almost 37 million "movers" in 1970. Among the "movers," 7.1
million moved between states, 23.2 million moved intracounty
and 6.3 million moved somewhere else in the same state.12 i Mobil-
ity is even greater over longer time periods.' 28 The literature on
migration is far too vast to be reviewed here, but two salient,
empirically verified hypotheses from that literature deserve at-
tention. First, geographers and urban sociologists have convinc-
ingly documented that internal migration is not a randomly
based demographic phenomenon, but rather involves distinctive
social, economic and ethnic subgroups.1 29 Migration between and
within cities, suburban and rural areas is an important, world-
124. 419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., H. ELDRIDGE, NET INTERCENSAL MIGRATION OF STATES AND GEOGRAPHIC
DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1950-60 (1965); V. FULLER, RURAL WORKER ADJUSTMENT
TO URBAN LIFE (1970); V. PACKARD, A NATION OF STRANGERS (1972); P. SCHWIND, MIGRATION
AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-60 (1971); TAEUBER, CHIAZZE &
HAENSZEL, MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF RESIDENCE HISTORIES,
U.S.P.H.S. Pub. No. 1575 (1968).
126. Between March of 1969 and March of 1970, 18.4 percent of the persons over 1
year of age who live in the United States moved to a different residence. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 210, Mobility of the Popula-
tion of the United States: March 1969 to 1970 at 1 (1971).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-
23, No. 25, Lifetime Migration Histories of the American People 5, Table 7 (1968).
129. See, e.g., BEHAVIOR IN NEW ENVIRONMENTS: ADOPTION OF MIGRANT POPULATIONS
(E. Brody ed. 1970); H. KARP & D. KELLY, TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERME-
TROPOLITAN MIGRATION (1971); READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MIGRATION (C. Jansen ed.
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wide "process of self-regulating 'adjustment' to what would oth-
erwise be an unbalanced distribution of population. '30
Migration has been facilitated by federally aided interstate
highways and federally subsidized air and rail transportation.
Migration has been encouraged by the development of a national
labor market and by national corporations. Occupational mobil-
ity, in many instances, has become almost a function of geograph-
ical mobility. The growth of nationally recognized universities
has encouraged mobility among young persons whose increasing
political awareness militates against nonparticipation in the pol-
itical process. It was inevitable that the confluence of the demo-
graphic, educational and occupational trends of recent decades
would legitimize interstate migration politically and exert heavy
pressures upon traditional, parochial barriers to interstate migra-
tion such as state durational residency requirements for public
office. As persons increasingly exercise their constitutional right
to travel in order to pursue an education or to earn a livelihood,
confrontations are bound to occur both in the places to which
they have migrated and, upon their return, to their native com-
munities.
Durational residency requirements for public office which
fall disproportionately upon discrete subgroups, such as racial
minorities and impoverished rural families who have moved to
urban areas in search of a better life, may merit correspondingly
closer judicial scrutiny.'3 ' Migration, itself, retards participation
in the political structure.' 32 However, political participation by
migrants "tends to increase directly with length of time in the
community within age, occupational and educational catego-
ries."' The behavioral predisposition against substantial politi-
cal involvement by migrants generally serves as a natural barrier
to political candidacy which is far more formidable than most
130. Research Comm. on Urban Sociology of the Int'l Sociological Ass'n, Report on
a Meeting in Stockholm in Sept. 1969, 9 Soc. ScI. INFO. 35, 43 (Dec. 1970) (remarks ofT.
Kuroda of Japan).
131. See, e.g., Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972). But cf. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 397 U.S. 821 (1971) (disproportionately larger percentage of minority grcips in
AFDC than in other categorical assistance programs not sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny
of AFDC classifications on racial grounds because of absence of proof of racial motivation
in the establishment of less favorable need allowances for AFDC than for recipients under
other welfare programs).
132. Zimmer, Participation of Migrants in Urban Structures in JANSEN, supra note
129, at 72.
133. Id. at 73.
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durational residency requirements for public office. Behavioral
factors influencing nonparticipation among migrants coming
from culturally dissimilar environments are especially strong,' 34
and, apparently, "younger persons are less affected by migration
than older persons."'35 The data suggests that "in some types of
behavior, migrants possessing low status characteristics never do
attain the same level of participation as natives. 136 Since politi-
cal participation is an important indicator of migrant adjustment
to a new community, such participation should be affirmatively
encouraged rather than disfavored by legal barriers such as dura-
tional residency requirements. Such requirements frustrate so-
cially important interests such as facilitating migrant adjustment
and affording a political escape valve for pressures which might
otherwise be manifested in antisocial conduct or anomic social
withdrawal.
As applied to urban, white-collar migrants moving between
culturally similar environments, durational residency require-
ments artificially retard political participation without reasona-
ble basis. Social scientists have recognized that there may be a
standardized urban culture shared by white-collar workers
which soon transcends the limiting influence of migration. That
is to say, that, in preparing for or in the pursuit of white-collar
work, persons learn at the same time an urban way of life, which
is carried with them in their migration. This urban culture
makes for a more rapid adjustment in the new community.37
IV. A REVIEW OF RECENT CASES CHALLENGING DURATIONAL
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
The Supreme Court has never given plenary consideration to
the constitutionality of durational residency requirements for
public office, although it has summarily affirmed three recent
cases upholding residency requirements for public office.' 38 Al-
though summary affirmance technically affords a decision on the
merits and has precedential value, docket pressures appear to be
134. Id., passim.
135. Id. at 74.
136. Id. at 83.
137. Id. at 75.
138. Kanapaux v. Ellison, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 1974), affl'd mem., 419
U.S. 891 (1974); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), afl'd mem., 414
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diminishing the distinction between denial of certiorari and sum-
mary affirmance to the extent that even several summary affirm-
ances may not indicate how the Court will ultimately decide a
question on plenary review. '39 Such cases, like the summary af-
firmances preceding Dunn and Edelman, offer vivid illustrative
proof that summary affirmances by the Supreme Court are some-
times misleading. Summary affirmance "settles the issues for the
parties" and affirms the district court's "judgment but not neces-
sarily the reasoning by which it was reached." 4 '
The lower courts have been groping for a resolution of the
problem of durational residency requirements for public office for
several years. Thus, when the Supreme Court eventually faces
the question, it will not write on a clean slate. A systematic review
of the previously decided lower court cases will enhance our un-
derstanding of the present state of the law, expose live issues
which are likely to emerge in later Supreme Court adjudication
and adumbrate the lines upon which a Supreme Court decision
may ultimately be drawn.
A. State Court Decisions
The states of California, Colorado, New Jersey, Missouri,
South Carolina, Hawaii, New York and Arizona have all recently
been faced with challenges to their durational residency require-
ments for public office in their courts of last resort."' From these
challenges a checkered pattern emerges.
139. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 561, 670-71 (1974). The Court disingen-
uously attempted to reconcile Edelman with previous summary affirmances of contrary
holdings by explaining that it is less constrained by the principle of stare decisis when it
decides constitutional questions. The practice of the Court has been to bow to "'the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.'"
Id. at 671 n.14 quoting Burnet v. Coronodo Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis' position on the limited applicability of stare decisis
in constitutional litigation appears to contemplate a substantial lapse of time sufficient
to generate experience indicating the need for a revised judicial policy. Compare, e.g.,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) with Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) and Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 U.S.
125 (1965), with the Court's decision 7 years later in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
337 (1972).
140. Fusari v. Steinburg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
141. Additionally, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently affirmed a lower court
decision, removing a candidate from the Democratic primary ballot for failure to satisfy
a 3-year durational residency requirement of the Maryland constitution, on state grounds
without considering the federal question. Bainum v. Kaler, 272 Md. 490, 325 A.2d 392
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1. California
The California Supreme Court has been directly confronted
with challenges to durational residency requirements no less than
three times in the past 5 years. The ensuing decisions are indica-
tive of a pattern that may be duplicated as the United States
Supreme Court is forced to provide a definitive set of guidelines
for evaluating residency requirements.
In 1971 the California Supreme Court heard the companion
cases of Camara v. Mellon' and Zeilenga v. Nelson.' The court,
sitting en banc, struck down the 3-year residency requirement in
Camara as violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, and directed the city clerk to place Camara's
name on the ballot for the upcoming election. 4 Zeilenga, how-
ever, involved an issue not present in Camara which is character-
istic of most challenges to durational residency requirements.
When the county clerk refused to issue nomination papers to
Zeilenga for supervisor, he and six voters who supported his can-
didacy petitioned for a writ of mandamus in the superior court
to compel his certification. The superior court denied the peti-
tion, and by the time the appeal had been perfected there was
not time before the election for the court of appeals to decide the
case. The court of appeals acknowledged that "[i]n a sense the
problem is moot because . . . [the] election has already taken
place."'' However, the court of appeals concluded, and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court agreed, that the "issue is a vital one...
of general public interest and should be determined before the
(1974). The construction of durational residency requirements on state constitutional
grounds is beyond the scope of this article except in cases such as the Missouri court's
decision in State of Missouri ex rel. King v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1972), which
may have been prompted by the court's attempt to avoid the federal question, and the
South Carolina court's decision in Ravenel v. Deckle, 265 S.C. 364, 218 S.E.2d 521
(1975), in which federal claims subsequently asserted by third parties were waived. See
notes 208-14, 223 and accompanying text infra.
142. 4 Cal. 3d 714, 484 P.2d 577, 94 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Camara involved a provi-
sion of the Santa Cruz city charter which prohibited any person from being a member of
the city council unless he had been a resident of the city for at least 3 years preceding his
election or appointment.
143. 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971). In Zeilenga petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of a 5-year residence requirement in the county charter
for all candidates for county supervisor.
144. The court references the opinion in Zeilenga as the basis for its decision in
Camara. Id. at 714, 484 P.2d at 577, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
145. 4 Cal. 3d at 719, 484 P.2d at 579, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 603. The California Supreme
Court adopted the language of the court of appeals in discussing the mootness issue.
[Vol. 27
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss5/4
1976] DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
next general election.""'4 Obviously, the relief sought by Zeilenga
would have been difficult to grant since the election had already
taken place. A new election could have been ordered, and, in
some contexts such an order may be appropriate.'4 7 Generally,
however, state interest in the finality of elections and the strong
social interest in avoiding the disruption of the electoral process
occasioned by a court ordered second election would considerably
outweigh the competing interest in the candidacy of an individ-
ual, whether that interest is asserted by the candidate or by the
voters. Upon finding the residency requirement in Zeilenga in-
valid the -court granted prospective relief only: the county clerk
was ordered "in future elections to disregard the residence re-
quirement of candidates for the county board of supervisors set
forth in the Butte County Charter."'4 8
Turning to the merits of the two cases, the court noted that
"[t]he right to hold public office, either by election or appoint-
ment, is one of the valuable rights of citizenship"; ' that it is a
"fundamental right"'50 which "the First Amendment protects
against infringement,"' 5' and emphasized that there is "a federal
constitutional right to be considered for public service without
146. Id. Under California law, an "issue does not become moot merely because the
question is of no further interest to the person who raised it." Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972) (" 'capable of repetition, yet evading review'"). Cf. Liner v.
Jafco, 377 U.S. 301, 304 (1964) (mootness, as applied to federal questions, is itself a
question of federal law).
The court also pointed out that
[i]n an additional sense the matter is not moot since the charter provision, if
valid, will prevent petitioner Zeilenga from being a candidate for the office of
supervisor either by election or appointment, should there become a vacancy,
until August 1973, as he will not have resided in Butte County for the necessary
five years before that date.
4 Cal. 3d at 720, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
147. See, e.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 367 (1969), where the Supreme Court
ordered a new election in Green County, Alabama, for various county offices for failure of
state officials to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Cf.
Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966).
148. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 786-87, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
149. 4 Cal. 3d at 720, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604, quoting Carter v. Commis-
sion on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal. 2d 179, 182, 93 P.2d 140, 142
(1939).
150. 4 Cal. 3d at 720, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604, quoting Fort v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 335, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
151. 4 Cal. 3d at 720, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604, quoting Johnson v. State
Civil Service Dep't, 280 Minn. 61, 157 N.W.2d 747 (1968) and Minielly v. State, 242 Ore.
490, 411 A.2d 69 (1966).
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the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications."'' 2 In
order to justify "any impairment" of these rights, the court
ar.gued, "[t]here must be present a compelling governmental
interest.""'5 The court could not, however, find a compelling in-
terest which would save the restrictions in either case, comment-
ing that
[p]erhaps in the horse and buggy days the five year re-
quirement could have been reasonable, but in these days of
modern public transportation, the automobile, newspapers,
radio, television and rapid dissemination of news throughout all
parts of the county, the requirement is unreasonable.'54
The court's real feelings about the requirements were quite ap-
parent, however, as the opinion continued.
It [the 5-year requirement] excludes certain citizens from pub-
lic office by a classification which is unnecessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest. It is a built-in device to
prevent competition against the county's oldtimers for the office
of supervisor. Nowhere is it shown that a candidate for the office
of supervisor cannot acquire competent knowledge of the
county's conditions in much less than five years to qualify him
for the office, at least sufficiently to submit to the voters for
their choice his knowledge thereof.'55
Although the court did not speculate in Zeilenga or Camara
as to what, if any, durational residency requirements for public
152. 4 Cal. 3d at 720-21, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604, quoting Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970).
153. 4 Cal. 3d at 721, 484 P.2d at 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 604, quoting Huntley v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 442 P.2d 685, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1968). The "compelling
interest" standard used here was derived from Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
where the United States Supreme Court held that discriminatory classifications which
affect a fundamental right must be supported by a compelling governmental interest. Id.
at 634. In recent years, the California Supreme Court has occasionally extended the
fundamental right/compelling interest rationale further than the federal courts. Compare,
eg., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), with San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Although the United
States Supreme Court's holdings on the reach of the federal law are controlling under the
supremacy clause, the door is open in election cases, as elsewhere, for state courts to go
further than the Supreme Court is willing in the protection of fundamental rights. Such
state holdings would be insulated against federal review because they are supported by
independent state grounds. The California Supreme Court did just that in Serrano, but
not in Zielenga.
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office could validly be imposed, it conclusively established that
durational residency requirements of 3 years or more were not
reasonably related to any compelling interest of the political sub-
divisions of the nation's largest state. While making reference to
federal authority supporting the propriety of bona fide residency
as qualification for holding public office," ' the court followed the
path of the three-judge federal district court in Hadnott v.
Amos' 57 in declining to decide whether or not some preelection
durational residence was necessary in the absence of a case
presenting such a question. The. Zeilenga majority did find some
guidance, however, in dicta from the New Jersey decision in
Gangemi v. Rosengard."'S The New Jersey Supreme Court felt
that "far from being unrestricted, the power to prescribe qualifi-
cations for elective office is sharply limited by the constitutional
guaranty of a right to vote.. ."I" and that "a prescribed qualifi-
cation for office must relate to the needs of officeholding as such
or the special needs of the particular office involved . .. ."I"
Finding no such relationship, the California court could not jus-
tify "such a heavy burden" as the 5-year Zeilenga requirement or
the 3-year residency required in Camara."'
The compelling interest standard was further developed in
the third California case, Thompson v. Mellon."2 The validity of
that standard, however, was sustained by a somewhat different
line of reasoning. Expressly reaffirming its belief that" 'the right
to run for public office is as fundamental as the right to vote,' """
the Thompson court proceeded to reconcile Bullock v. Carter"4
with the California court's commitment to strict scrutiny in the
evaluation of "restrictions upon candidacy for public office which
[exclude] a significant group of potential candidates from the
ballot . ... "I Although Bullock dealt with the unconstitu-
156. See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 116 (1967).
157. 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 968 (1970).
158. 44 N.J. 166, 207 A.2d 665 (1965).
159. Id. at 171, 207 A.2d at 667.
160. Id.
161. 4 Cal. 3d at 722, 484 P.2d at 581-82, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 605-06. The California
Supreme Court thus expressly overruled its earlier holding in Sheehan v. Scott, 145 Cal.
684, 79 P. 350 (1905), in which a 5-year durational residency requirement for the office of
tax collector of San Francisco was approved-a "horse and buggy case." See note 154 and
accompanying text supra.
162. 9 Cal. 3d 96, 507 P.2d 628, 107 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1973).
163. Id. at 99, 507 P.2d at 631, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
164. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra.
165. 9 Cal. 3d at 100, 507 P.2d at 631, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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tionality of restrictive filing fees, the Thompson court, neverthe-
less, found the analysis applied in that case to be analagous.
Thus, the court noted that although durational residency require-
ments for public office differ from filing fees in that the latter
"'fall more heavily on minority economic and political groups,'
this distinction, "'while significant, does not render. . .Bullock
inapplicable [since] the grounds asserted for utilizing the "com-
pelling interest" test were alternative,' "'I6 The analysis in either
instance proceeds from the premise that" 'where the law in ques-
tion poses an absolute barrier to the candidacy of a not insubstan-
tial segment of the community and, to that degree, limits the
voters in their choice of candidates, the more strict standard of
review must be applied.' """
In light of the factual context of Thompson, the California
court's conclusion is especially appealing. Thompson was a law-
yer who had resided in Santa Cruz County for 7 years, yet had
resided in the city of Santa Cruz for less than a year. While
recognizing that "the state has a legitimate interest in requiring
'a reasonable knowledge by a proposed candidate of the general
requirements' of the public entity in which he seeks office,"' 8 the
court found this justification inappropriate as a practical matter
in the Thompson case. 6 ' In the thicket of overlapping city,
county, precinct, and special district boundaries of urbanized
California, and, for that matter much of the United States, it
would be awkward to suggest that new city residents who have
long resided in the county are less knowledgeable about the prob-
lems of city government than recent migrants from culturally
dissimilar environments who satisfy durational residency require-
ments. Thus, it would be patently absurd to suggest that Thomp-
son, an attorney and resident of Santa Cruz County for 7 years,
knew less about the problems of the city of Santa Cruz than a
blue-collar worker who had moved to the city 2 years previous
from rural Oklahoma.1 70 Accordingly, the Thompson court relied
heavily on the authority of Dunn v. Blumstein1 7' and concluded
that a 2-year durational residency requirement did not serve a
166. Id. at 101, 507 P.2d at 632, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
167. Id.
168. 9 Cal. 3d at 102, 507 P.2d at 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
169. Id. at 105, 507 P.2d at 635, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
170. See JANSEN, supra note 129, at 75.
171. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See notes 58-60, 64-76 and accompanying text supra.
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compelling state interest.
172
The Thompson case poses an additional consideration often
overlooked in the maze of constitutional arguments concerning
durational residency requirements. In Justice Sullivan's plurality
opinion, it was declared that all durational residency require-
ments for public office in excess of 30-days preceding the deadline
for filing nomination papers or an equivalent declaration of can-
didacy were invalid.13 There arises immediate difficulty with this
finding in that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Burns and Marston, upholding the 50-day Arizona and Georgia
durational residency requirements to voting, suggests that the
talismanic effect accorded the Dunn 30-day period by the Califor-
nia court may be misplaced, at least as a matter of federal law.
But more importantly, this illustrates the difficulty of deciding
precisely where the line should be drawn on durational residency
requirements for public office. As the length of the requirements
diminishes, it seems apparent that judicial consensus becomes
172. 9 Cal. 3d at 105, 507 P.2d at 635, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 27. In essence, the plurality
in Thompson saw the purposes served by durational residency requirements for public
office in excess of 30 days as provincial and inconsistent with the ethical postulates of a
democratic society. The pulse of Judge Sullivan's opinion can be measured from his
observation that
[plerhaps there may be some communities which in their desire to preserve the
status quo, will attempt to impose political silence on the newcomer until he
has accommodated himself to the local "scene." But new arrivals shed none of
their fundamental rights by exercising their right to travel and may not be
arbitrarily excluded from either a voice or a role in the affairs of their newly
selected home. In these times of political and social ferment, intensified by an
extraordinarily movable population, the status quo of the community, if worthy
of preservation, must justify its continued acceptance through the free exercise
of the ballot box.
• . .The hallowed belief in the wisdom and power of the electorate must not
be sold short and may not be circumscribed by artificial residence barriers
fencing in the right to vote or the right to be a candidate for public office.
9 Cal. 3d at 105, 507 P.2d at 635, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
173. Tobriner, J., concurred. Wright, C.J., and Molinari, J., concurred in the judg-
ment only "insofar as it holds that the two-year durational residence requirement. . is
invalid." Id. at 107, 507 P.2d at 636, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 28. Mosk, J., concurred, but would
have based the holding on state constitutional grounds and would have had the 30 day
durational residency period run from the date of the election rather than from the time
for filing nominating papers or other declaration of candidacy. Id. at 110, 507 P.2d at
638, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 28. Burke, J., joined by McComb, J., dissented on the ground that
a 2-year requirement was reasonable and necessary. Id. at 110, 507 P.2d at 640, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 28. Cf. Young v. Gnoss, 7 Cal. 3d 18, 27, 496 P.2d 445, 101 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1972)
(state durational residency requirements for voting in excess of 30 days held invalid under
Dunn.)
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more difficult.' This is not surprising since such questions are
subject to resolution only on a judgmental basis, and reasonable
differences of opinion are to be expected.
The difficulty which this lack of judicial consensus presents
was squarely confronted by Justice Mosk in his concurring opin-
ion to Thompson. Expressly noting the "absence of objective cri-
teria" for deciding the reasonableness of durational residency re-
quirements of any particular length, 75 Justice Mosk reasoned
that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the holdings were
"apparently reached via a visceral route. 1 7 Since vagueness of
permissible limits "only assures future litigation" and is adverse
to the principle that "predictability is the hallmark of a responsi-
ble judicial system," his concurrence concludes that "any citizen
qualified to vote in a jurisdiction should be entitled to seek public
office in that jurisdiction, assuming in appropriate instances he
possesses the required professional qualifications. ' 177 In this con-
text, the Mosk proposal is appealing because of its simplicity and
its consistency with a democratic decisionmaking process. Most
significantly, as contended by Justice Mosk, it is "naive. . . to
believe that the absence of durational residence requirements will
automatically catapult uninformed candidates into public off-
ice.' '7 The ballot box, he suggests, affords the people all the
protection they need. 179
174. No better example of this premise could possibly be found than the divergence
of opinions presented by the Thompson court. Sullivan and Peters, J.J., presumably
would invalidate requirements of greater than 30 days before filing for nomination. Mosk,
J., would invalidate requirements in excess of 30 days prior to the election. Tobiner and
Molinari, J.J., and Wright, C.J., consider 2-year requirements unreasonable and would
either disagree with the 30 day dictum of the plurality opinion or be unwilling to reach
the question until presented with a case or controversy.




179. Id. at 108-09, 507 P.2d at 637, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 29. Justice Mosk's argument on
this premise deserves careful consideration:
Inevitably time in the jurisdiction will be a significant issue in local political
campaigns. The "life-long resident" of a community will tout his superior famil-
iarity with the problems of the area. The recent settler will assuredly be faced
with the charge he is an interloper or carpetbagger. In most instances the candi-
date well tutored in community problems will be better known by the electorate
and will prevail. But if the voters exercise their franchise to reject the life-long
resident, and prefer to be represented by the newcomer, restraints imposed by
a past citizenry, presumably to prevent future folly, should not be permitted to
thwart such democratically determined result.
[Vol. 27
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The dissenting opinion of Justice Burke raises some provoca-
tive questions. In sum, he adheres to a more narrow view of
Bullock than that of the majority and raises questions concerning
the applicability of the strict scrutiny standard to qualifications
imposed on candidacy for public office, absent discrimination
based on wealth, or some other suspect qualification. 8 ' Hence,
the dissent contends that, even assuming the applicability of the
strict scrutiny standard, a durational residency requirement of 2-
years, given "the lack of feasible alternative provisions, . . . [is]
reasonably necessary" to promote the legitimate state interest in
assuring "that knowledgeable candidates appear on the ballot."' 8 '
The dissenters in Thompson posited several allegedly legiti-
mate state interests underlying durational residency require-
ments for public office: the constitutional authority of municipal-
ities to control their own affairs and to exercise "home-rule" pow-
ers;" 2 the duty to afford voters "some firm basis for judging the
character and ability of the candidates appearing on the bal-
lot";' to "provide [what is often] the only opportunity for voter-
candidate contact in a noncampaign atmosphere";'84 and to im-
prove the quality of public decisionmaking by winnowing out
candidates not sufficiently "responsible for managing civic affairs
and making day-to-day decisions which municipal officials must
face."' 85 Of these, the only state interest asserted by the
Thompson dissenters not previously considered is the "home-
rule" interest. It may be that this particular interest is premised
on the values of "democratic decisionmaking," approved by the
180. Id. at 111-12, 507 P.2d at 639, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (Burke and McComb, J.J.,
dissenting). Bullock tacitly implied this since it was there held that the "existence of...
barriers [to candidacy] does not of itself compel close scrutiny." 405 U.S. at 145. But
see notes 165-69 and accompanying text supra.
181. 9 Cal. 3d at 111, 507 P. 2d at 639, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted). Although Judge Burke admits that "a new resident/candidate conceiv-
ably could gain familiarity with local problems by intensive study and research of his
locale, and a long-time resident/candidate may lack such familiarity altogether," he,
nevertheless, alleges that "the residence requirement is generally the most practical assur-
ance of a candidate's minimum qualifications in this regard." Id. at 111, 507 P.2d at 639,
107 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (emphasis in original). The dissenters clearly see this approach as
justifiable since the standard of analysis deemed controlling by them is one of "reasonable
necessity" which does not attain the level of "[p]erfect precision." Id. at 112, 507 P.2d
at 640, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
182. Id. at 111, 507 P.2d at 639, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
183. Id. at 112, 507 P.2d at 640, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 113, 507 P.2d at 640, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
1976]
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Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra,5 6 which emphasized the
importance of giving "all the people of the community a voice in
decisions that will affect the future development of their own
community." '
Considering the general posture of restraint taken by the
present Supreme Court, the reasonable basis test may be the
appropriate standard, and, accordingly, the less restrictive dura-
tional residency requirements could be acceptable. Admittedly,
the present Court has disfavored a number of substantial claims
to extend the scope of strict scrutiny in light of the concomitant
increase in judicial intervention in the legislative process which
that analysis entails.' 5 However, political claims are readily dis-
tinguishable from the "affirmative and reformatory" claims
which would involve the courts in the essentially legislative func-
tion of allocating scarce state resources. That is, challenges to
durational residency requirements for public office seek relief
which is essentially negative in character and clearly falls within
the range of questions appropriate for judicial resolution, al-
though the question of precisely where the line should be drawn
is both vexing and essentially arbitrary. Additionally, it may be
important that judicial disapproval of durational residency re-
quirements for public office does not drain judicial resources nor
require continuing supervision of the legislative process, as have
the legislative apportionment and redistricting decisions.
2. Colorado
In Bird v. City of Colorado Springs'89 the Colorado Supreme
Court invalidated a 5-year durational residency requirement for
the position of Colorado Springs city councilman." In a brief
opinion, the Colorado court based its holding on the authority of
Zeilenga v. Nelson'9 ' and McKinney v. Kaminsky,'92 both of
186. 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(strict scrutiny not applicable to school financing); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
(strict scrutiny not applicable to housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (1970)
(strict scrutiny not applicable to welfare).
189. 507 P.2d 1099 (Colo. 1973).
190. Id. According to his affidavit, petitioner would have resided in the city for 4
years, 6 months on the date of the election. Id.
191. 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971).
192. 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
[Vol. 27
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which invalidated 5-year requirements. The following month, in
Cowan v. City of Aspen, '93 the Colorado Supreme Court invalida-
ted a 3-year city durational residency requirement for mayor and
councilman.'94 However, the Cowan court approved a 1-year
state durational residency requirement for municipal candidates
which became applicable upon invalidation of the city charter
requirement.'
To support its finding that a 3-year durational residency re-
quirement for public office is unreasonable, the Cowan court re-
lied upon Camara v. Mellon."6 Additionally, the court adopted
the compelling interest standard of Zielenga and Camara as ap-
propriate "[since] the right to hold public office, by either ap-
pointment or election, is one of the valuable and fundamental
rights of citizenship." '197 Upon the authority of the New York
Court of Appeals in Landes v. Town of North Hempstead,"' the
Cowan court went further to imply that a 3-year durational resi-
dency requirement for public office, like the property ownership
qualifications for public office in Landes, bore no "reasonable
relation to . . . [its] object."'99 This poses an interesting consid-
eration since the lack of a reasonable relationship between a clas-
sification and its object is, of course, sufficient reason for invalid-
ity under the rational basis test. Accordingly, if a 3-year dura-
tional residency requirement bears no reasonable relationship to
its object, the application of a compelling interest standard by
the Cowan court was premature.
The interests asserted by the city of Aspen were to insure "a
mayor and council of high quality. . . well acquainted with the
issues and problems; . . . to prevent frivolous candidacies by
persons who have little interest in the conditions and needs of the
City of Aspen," and to "insure that an individual would have
greater contact with other members of the community and would
• . . be in a better position to administer the needs of the com-
munity as a public officer."' 2°1 The Colorado court concluded that
the asserted interests fell "far short of . [the required] clear
193. 509 P.2d 1269 (Colo. 1973).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1273.
196. 4 Cal. 3d 714, 484 P.2d 577, 94 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
197. 509 P.2d at 1272.
198. 20 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1967).
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and precise showing" because of the difficulty of "draw[ing] the
line between basic needs of the office which may be determined
for the voters by candidacy requirements, and the individual
fitness of a candidate which must be left to the choice of the voter
if voting is to mean anything.
'20 1
3. New Jersey
In Gangemi v. Rosengard2°2 the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated a 2-year durational residency requirement for mayor
of Jersey City. Gangemi poses two interesting considerations.
First, it was decided in 1965, a full 5 years before the spate of
other state and federal cases involving durational residency re-
quirements for public office. Second, the court's holding rested on
independent state as well as federal constitutional issues.
With regard to the specific case before it, the Gangemi court
observed that the 2-year durational residency requirement was
"unusual" in that the state constitution made "no such demand
even of a candidate for Governor. . .or for Senator or Assembly-
man .... "03 The court admitted the reasonableness of special
qualifications for certain public offices which may call for the
skill of a lawyer, physician or engineer. But the court did not
blindly accept the assumption that candidates for office in a dem-
ocratic society must possess special knowledge:
to measure qualifications for elective office by the depth of a
candidate's interest in or understanding of public matters
whether the test be the length of his registration record or some
sophisticated quiz ... [opens the door to] knavery. ...
[I]ndividual fitness is something the voters decide and the in-
tensity of a candidate's interest is part and parcel of that sub-
ject. The Legislature cannot take that issue from [the vot-
ers]. .... 204
Thus, the New Jersey court concluded that the 2-year durational
residency requirement violated the federal guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. Since Gangemi was decided before the
strict scrutiny test was applied to some voting cases, the court's
decision is authority for the proposition that a 2-year durational
201. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added).
202. 44 N.J. 166, 207 A.2d 665 (1965).
203. Id. at 173, 207 A.2d at 669.
204. Id. at 174, 207 A.2d at 669.
[Vol. 27
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residency requirement for mayor has no rational basis and is
wholly unrelated to any legitimate state interest.
4. Missouri
In State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh"0 5 the Missouri Supreme
Court upheld a 1-year, state senate district durational residency
requirement."' 6 The court's opinion in this case evidences two
interesting aspects of analysis. First, the Missouri court distin-
guished Dunn on the ground that it pertained to voting, not can-
didacy, a distinction incompatible with the trend of recent fed-
eral authority.0 ' Secondly, the court applied the rational basis
rather than the compelling interest standard to determine the
constitutional validity of the challenged durational residency re-
quirement.
In Missouri ex rel. King v. Walsh,2 1 the Missouri Supreme
Court held that now governor Kit Bond met the 10-year dura-
tional residency requirement of the Missouri constitution,2 9 and
thus qualified for a position on the ballot as Republican nominee
for governor. Bond was in the mainstream of the increasingly
mobile, educated and politically active segment of the American
population. During the 10 years preceding his candidacy, Bond,
for substantial periods of time, resided in and had been admitted
to the bars of Georgia and the District of Columbia, as well as
Missouri. In addition, he had been admitted to the bar of Vir-
ginia, where he had attended law school, and had been employed
briefly in New York City. During some of the years Bond was
absent from Missouri he had paid Missouri taxes and voted in
that state. Additionally, his wife had joined his hometown church
in 1967. Bond urged that he secured out-of-state "temporary
employments for the sole purpose of continuing his education and
205. 483 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1972).
206. Like Camara, Gralike involves the right of intrastate travel. See notes 150-52
and accompanying text supra.
207. Compare, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) with
Lubin v. Parrish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). In striking a cadence much more closely atuned to
Dunn, the dissenting opinion in Gralike accused the court of being out of step with the
"direction in which the law is progressing" and, further, noted that "[a]ll the one year
residence requirement does is to serve provincialism and prejudice the newcomer and
those who would support him politically." 483 S.W.2d 70, 80 (Silver, J., dissenting).
208. 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1972).
209. Id. at 642. The Constitution of Missouri art. 4, § 3 provides: "The governor...
shall have been . . . a resident of this state at least ten years next before election."
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training by actual experience in the profession he intended to
practice in his home state and that he at all times intended to
return to Missouri,"2 ' and, as a citizen of that state, to "practice
law and engage in partisan politics." '' Interpreting the question
of residence or domicile as "one of fact . . .often difficult to
determine . . .[and] largely a matter of intention, 212 the Mis-
souri court put a gloss on the 10-year durational residency clause
of the Missouri constitution and held that it does not "require
actual, physical presence continuous and uninterrupted for ten
years. 2 13 The Missouri court obviously appears to have given the
benefit of the substantial doubt to Bond to avoid the federal
constitutional question. On the basis of admittedly authentic
documentary evidence and Bond's own testimony, it is difficult
not to agree with the dissenters that, as a matter of fact, Bond
did not meet the 10-year durational residency requirement of the
Missouri constitution.1 4
5. South Carolina
In Ravenel v. Dekle215 the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the state's 5-year durational residency requirement for
Governor 211 and enjoined the state election commission from plac-
ing the name of the winner of the Democratic primary, Charles
Ravenel, on the general election ballot. 7 In Ravenel, it had been
210. 484 S.W.2d at 643.
211. Id. at 644.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting); id. at 649 Bardgett, J., dissenting.
215. 265 S.C. 364, 218 S.E.2d 521 (1975).
216. Id. The South Carolina Constitution of 1895 art. 4, § 3 provides: "No person shall
be eligible to the office of Governor .. .who shall not have been .. . a citizen and
resident of this state for five years next preceeding the day of election."
217. The South Carolina court summarized the key facts of the case:
Mr. Ravenel is a native of Charleston and during his many years away from
South Carolina, there is abundant evidence that he intended to some day return
to and resume an actual residence in South Carolina. He did return in March,
1972. In November, 1969, five years prior to the upcoming election, he was an
actual resident of and working in the State of New York where he had returned
to work in 1967 after a year's residency in Washington, D.C. He continued to
actually reside in New York until 1972. In May, 1968, he registered to vote in
the State of New York, certifying to the authorities that by the time of the
General Election in 1968, he would have been a resident of that state for one
year and one month. He thereafter voted, apparently regularly in New York,
having voted in five different elections in that state before returning to his home
city and state in March, 1972.
[Vol. 27
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stipulated, allegedly for political reasons, 28 that the sole issue
involved was:
Was Charles D. Ravenel a citizen and resident of the State of
South Carolina for a period of five years next preceding the date
of the General Election . . within the meaning of Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution of South Carolina?
219
The South Carolina court held, in contrast to the Missouri court's
holding in King, that the South Carolina constitution's dura-
tional residency requirement for governor requires actual resi-
dence in the state for the five-year period22 and denied a place
on the ballot to Ravenel who had won the votes of approximately
187,000 state voters in the run-off primary. The ill-fated Ravenel
candidacy emphasizes the urgency for plenary consideration of
lengthy durational residency requirements for public office by the
United States Supreme Court, although the egregious errors of
Ravenel's legal strategy makes sympathy difficult.
Ravenel, in effect, got two bites at the apple. On March 27,
1974, the South Carolina Democratic Party permitted Ravenel to
file for Governor pending the outcome of a court suit concerning
his eligibiliy.221 On April 29, 1974, State Circuit Judge John
Grimball ruled in a "friendly" suit that Ravenel was eligible to
run for the party's nomination.2 2 Although a definitive interpre-
tation of Ravenel's eligibility under state law could have come
only from the South Carolina Supreme Court, no appeal was
taken from the circuit court ruling and no request was made for
the state supreme court to assume original jurisdiction in the
case. Had an appeal been taken, or original jurisdiction assumed,
there would have been ample time for a state court decision and
a federal appeal, if appropriate. Then, in Ravenel v. Dekle, Rave-
nel's counsel unmistakably waived Ravenel's federal claims:
He filed his first income tax return in South Carolina in the year 1973 for
the fiscal year 1972. Therein he certified that he had been a resident of the State
of South Carolina for only a portion of the year 1972 and that he had not filed a
tax return for the year 1971 because he was not a legal resident of South Carolina
in that year.
22 Smith's Advance Reports 17-18 (1974).
218. Telephone conversation with Heyward Belser, Esq., Columbia, S.C., (counsel for
Mr. Ravenel in Ravenel v. Dekle), September 25, 1974.
219. 265 S.C. at 367, 218 S.E.2d at 522.
220. Id. at 377, 218 S.E.2d at 527.
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The Court: Is there any contention on your part of the
unconstitutionality of any statute or anything?
Mr. Belser (Mr. Ravenel's attorney): We have not raised
any such contention and have no intention of it.
The Court: No constitutional question.
Mr. Belser: No Federal Constitutional question. Is that
what you are asking?
The Court: I'm asking about State or Federal.
Mr. Belser: We say we comply with the terms of the Con-
stitution. We are not seeking to attack the validity of the South
Carolina Constitution.
The Court: All right, sir. I'll put down no constitutional
questions, not attacking validity of South Carolina Constitu-
tion. Is that correct?
Mr. Belser: We are not intending to do that, that's cor-
rect.m
Even conceding that political as well as legal considerations are
relevant to political litigation, the legal strategy of the Ravenel
candidacy proved as ruinous as the political strategy was bril-
liant. Whatever the political unpopularity of federal constitu-
tional claims in South Carolina, the fact remains that the vindi-
cation of his federal claims afforded Ravenel his only route to the
governorship in the 1974 elections. Whether the decision to waive
Ravenel's federal claims was occasioned by the candidate's lack
of sensitivity to the critical federal question affecting his candi-
dacy or by unfortunate choice of legal strategy is unknown, but
it seems clear that in so doing Ravenel neglected grounds for
contesting the validity of durational residency requirements
which might ultimately have been decided in his favor.2
223. Record at 48, Ravenel v. Dekle, 265 S.C. 364, 218 S.E.2d 521 (1975), quoted
in Appellees' Motion to Affirm at 3 n.2, Kanapaux v. Ellison, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C.
Sept. 26, 1974).
224. The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Ravenel was a valid, final
personal judgment. As such, it extinguished Ravenel's original claim or cause of action.
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942). Ravenel would have been barred by prior
judgment from subsequently maintaining an action on the same claim or cause of action,
although he presented grounds for relief not presented in the original action, id. § 63, for
example, federal constitutional grounds. The effect of this rule is salutary-it coerces the
plaintiff to present all of his grounds for recovery in the first proceeding. See Baltimore
S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1927). A subsequent voter suit raising Ravenel's
original claim or cause of action would likewise be precluded since the voter would be in
no better position than a transferee. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 90 (1942). "If the
unsuccessful party were able by a transfer to release from the effect of the judgment...
[Vol. 27
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6. Hawaii
The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld a 3-year residency re-
quirement for membership in the state legislature in Hayes v.
Gill.25 The Hawaii court observed that the "different considera-
tions. . . involved in a right to vote and a right to run or to hold
office . . . [are] indicated by Turner v. Fouche2 .1 . . .where
the court resolved the issue of discrimination under the pre-
Kramer2 .2 test and declined to rule on the applicability of the
compelling state interest test. ' 22 The Hawaii court was not re-
sponsive to the real thrust of Turner-that some restrictions upon
candidacy may be so demonstrably unreasonable that they fail to
satisfy even the less stringent reasonable basis standard. The
Hawaii court believed that a 3-year residency requirement satis-
filed the reasonable basis standard but declined to state whether
it would pass strict scrutiny.
7. New York
In DeHond v. Nyquist 2 7 the Supreme Court of Albany
County, New York, upheld a 3-year residency requirement for
holding office on the county Board of Education. The court found
that "[residence] has been a traditional qualification for holding
public office in New York"228 and that there is a "strong presump-
tion of constitutionality" of such legislative enactments.
29
claims which in his hands would be adversely affected by the judgment because of the
rules of collateral estoppel, the rules would have substantially no value to the successful
party." Id.
225. 52 Hawaii 251, 473 P.2d 872 (1970).
225.1. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
225.2. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
226. 52 Hawaii at 259-61, 473 P.2d at 879.
227. 65 Misc. 2d 526, 318 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 1971).
228. Id. at 529, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
229. Id. But cf. Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120,
284 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1967). In Landes, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a property
ownership requirement on candidacy for town office and took note of "changes in the
pattern of town and suburban living" which have resulted in a society characterized by
"mobility" and "anonymity". Id. at 419-21, 231 N.E.2d at 120-21, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 443-
44, quoting Cox, THE SECULAR Crry 33 (rev. ed. 1966). Although the New York Court of
Appeals based its holding in Landes on state as well as federal constitutional grounds, the
court recognized the "viewpoint of the person seeking office" and denied that legislative
authority to prescribe qualifications for office authorized "arbitrary exclusions from of-
fice." Id. at 419-20, 231 N.E.2d at 121, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
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8. Arizona
In Triano v. Massion 0 the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a 1-year, city-voting-ward durational residency
requirement for city council candidates on the authority of Judge
Burke's dissent in Thompson v. Mellonz1 and the three-judge
federal court's holding in Draper v. Phelps.
2
B. Federal Courts of Appeals Decisions
Two circuits have affirmed district court orders invalidating
durational residency requirements for public office. In Wellford
v. Battaglia233 the Third Circuit upheld the district court's
order invalidating a 5-year durational residency requirement for
mayor of Wilmington, Delaware. Both courts agreed that the
city's asserted interest in a chief executive officer who is knowl-
edgeable of its problems and resources constitutes a legitimate
government interest. Moreover, neither court was willing to say
that there is "no rational connection between this interest and the
five-year residency requirement."' 4 The district court ruled, and
the Third Circuit agreed, that the compelling interest test was the
appropriate standard of review, as opposed to the reasonable
basis test, because of the requirement's infringement of the fun-
damental rights to vote and to travel. 35 Wellford involved
intrastate movement, and the district court reasoned that the
right to travel includes intrastate as well as interstate migra-
tion.2 11
In Green v. McKeonW37 a divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed
the district court order invalidating a 2-year, city durational resi-
dency and property ownership requirement. It is clear that the
property ownership requirement is invalid under the Supreme
Court's holdings in Kramer and Cipriano. The district court con-
cluded that "the compelling interest standard is the proper yards-
tock [sic] for judicial scrutiny"2 s because of the dilution of the
230. 109 Ariz. 506, 513 P.2d 935 (1973).
231. See notes 180-85 and accompanying text supra.
232. See notes 307-24 and accompanying text infra.
233. 343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973).
234. Id. at 145-46.
235. Id. at 147.
236. Id.
237. 335 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afl'd, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972).
238. Id. at 632.
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fundamental rights to vote and to travel.29 The Sixth Circuit
declined to "pass on the question of whether the impact of Plym-
outh's charter provision on the exercise of the franchise is suffi-
cient to satisfy the criteria of Bullock to trigger application of the
more stringent standard" of review. But the Sixth Circuit
thought that strict scrutiny was appropriate in view of the classi-
fication's penalty on the "basic constitutional right to travel."2'
Candidate familiarity with "local. . . government and the prob-
lems peculiar to the municipality" may be desirable, but the
Sixth Circuit considered a 2-year residency requirement "too
broad for the achievement of that objective . . . [because the]
restriction is in no way 'tailored' to achieve the stated municipal
goal. 2 2 The classification was held invalid because it
permits a two year resident of Plymouth to hold public office
regardless of his lack of knowledge of the governmental prob-
lems of the city. On the other hand, it excludes more recent
arrivals who have had experience in local government elsewhere
or who have made diligent efforts to become well acquainted
with the municipality.243
The ethical premise of the Sixth Circuit holding is that "in
our representative form of government, the voters are the arbiters
of the suitability of candidates for public office." 4 The question
of "[w]hether a candidate has the ability to carry out the duties
of a particular city office" 245 should be left to the voters. The
political campaign is the appropriate forum for discussing the
deficiencies of the respective candidates.
In his dissent in Green, Judge O'Sullivan disapproved of
the court's use of the strict scrutiny test and stated that the
durational residency requirement was not "invidiously dis-
criminating. ' 26 He asserted a tenth amendment bar to federal
review of state durational residency qualifications47 and voiced
apprehension over the "growing public concern arising from the
239. Id. at 634-35.
240. 468 F.2d at 884.
241. Id.
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ever-increasing taking over by the United States Courts of the
prerogatives of the State Legislatures." '48 Judge O'Sullivan de-
clared that if "revision of the law [is needed] such can and
should be accomplished by the people through their elected legis-
lative representatives, and not summarily ordered by judicial
command."249
But, as long ago as 1938, Mr. Justice Stone observed that
there "may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when . . .statutes . . .[tend] seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied on to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching scrutiny. =2 It would be unrealistic to
expect recent migrants to look to the political process for the
abolition of durational residency requirements for public office.
Except in a few, highly mobile communities, recent migrants are
as incapable of obtaining political relief as were urban voters
attempting to escape rural political domination.21
Most of the recent cases challenging durational residency
requirements have involved elective office. However, in Lehman
v. City of Pittsburgh,=11 the Third Circuit reversed and remanded
the dismissal of a complaint challenging the validity of a 2-year
durational residency requirement as a condition precedent to
application for city employment on the authority of Dunn,
Shapiro and several other lower court cases.
C. Federal District Court Decisions
Challenges to the validity of durational residency require-
ments for public office have been heard 11 times since 1970 in
federal district courts by single judges and by specially consti-
tuted three-judge panels.
1. Single-judge cases
In Stapleton v. City of Inkster23 a city charter provision es-
tablishing a 2-year durational residency and property ownership
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
251. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
252. 474 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1973).
253. 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
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requirement for membership on the city council was challenged
with the property ownership requirement being invalidated be-
cause of its failure to meet either the compelling interest or the
rational basis standard.2"4
In Bolanowski v. Raich215 a 3-year durational residency re-
quirement for mayoral candidates in Warren, Michigan was in-
validated for failure to satisfy a "compelling municipal inter-
est." 216 The asserted municipal interests were to assure that can-
didates "understand all the local problems, know the people of
the community, and demonstrate local leadership to solve the
problems";257 to give voters "a chance to know. . . [the] charac-
ter and reputation" of candidates; 28 and to meet the special
knowledge requirements associated with Warren's "'strong
Mayor' form of Government. 2 9 The court believed that the com-
pelling interest standard of review was appropriate because of the
qualification's incursion on the right to vote.
When presented with the dual question of whether the as-
serted municipal interests are legitimate and whether the
classification is tailored with sufficient precision, courts first
should determine "if the exclusions are necessary to promote the
articulated state interest. '20 Only if the court concludes that
exclusions are precisely tailored to achieve the articulated state
goal, need the court reach the question of "whether the interest
promoted [by the classification] . . . constitutes a compelling
state interest.2 16 1 Many courts confuse the Kramer test by at-
tempting to establish both that a classification is overly broad
and that it fails to meet a compelling state interest. The court in
Bolanowski correctly applied the Kramer test and decided that
the 3-year durational residency requirement for public office did
not satisfy the exacting standard of precision required of statutes
which selectively distribute the franchise. 262 The 3-year dura-
254. Although the charter provision was invalidated under Kramer, Cipriano and
Turner, the 2-year durational residency provision was not at issue since it was conceded
that plaintiff met "all of the requirements except that of 'being a property owner of the
City for two years.'" Id. at 1189, quoting § 5.1(a) of the Charter of the City of Inkster.
255. 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
256. Id. at 726.
257. Id. at 730.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.14 (1969).
261. Id.'
262. 330 F. Supp. at 731.
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tional residency requirement was not " 'tailored so that the exclu-
sion of [plaintiff] and members of his class is necessary to
achieve the articulated [municipal] goal.' "263 Many adult citi-
zens of the city may have lived their entire lives in Warren "with-
out taking any interest whatsoever in municipal problems...
[and would] not fit the articulated qualifications.1 264 Others
"may have lived in the City for 21/ years and gathered sufficient
knowledge to be able to have a good understanding of all aspects
of the municipality's difficulties. '26 5 Since the law failed for im-
precision, the court did not need to question whether the asserted
state interests were legitimate.
In McKinney v. Kaminsky266 the district court invalidated a
5-year district durational residency requirement for county
commissioner. At the time plaintiff sought election, he had been
a resident of Montgomery County for almost 25 years but had
lived for only 2 years in the Southwestern District from which he
sought to be a candidate. Plaintiff was a resident and qualified
elector of the district from which he sought election. The court
concluded that the "right to seek and hold public office . . . is a
property right . . . [and that] questions . . . of eligibility . . .
should be resolved in favor of the candidate. '2 1 The court relied
on Shapiro,218 Kramer 2 1 and Cipriano2' to support its position
that although the "state's right to prescribe qualifications of one
seeking public office [citation omitted] is a police power re-
served to the states under the Tenth Amendment," invasion of
the individual interest to equal protection of the laws requires "a
showing of a compelling state interest .. ."21 Two state inter-
ests were asserted: the need for a county commissioner to be
particularly knowledgeable concerning the geography and the
roads in the part of the county in which he is to serve; and the
need to prevent "unfair political competition from persons who
have resided primarily in the more populous areas of the
263. Id., citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
267. Id. at 294.
268. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968). See notes 99-100 and accompanying
text supra.
269. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
270. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
271. 340 F. Supp. at 294.
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county. ' ' 21 The court took judicial notice of the fact that "other
counties contain urban and rural areas of unequal population,
and the Legislature has not seen fit to place residence require-
ments of several years in the district for which the commissioner
offers for election in those counties."' The court also attached
significance to the fact that of 13 major types of elective offices
in Alabama, only four had county or district durational residency
requirements.24 Relying on the authority of Stapleton,275 Hadnott
IF' 6 and Bolanowski,27 7 the district court concluded that the 5-
year, district residency was repugnant to the equal protection
clause as not justified by a compelling state interest.278
In Alexander v. Kammer2 7 the district court invalidated city
requirements that a candidate reside in the city for 5 years as a
precondition of candidacy to the city commission. The govern-
mental interests asserted in support of the classification were to
"provide the electorate with the opportunity to become better
acquainted with the candidate,""28 and to "insure the candidate's
familiarity with the city and its needs."' 1 Although the asserted
governmental interests were considered "worthwhile and even
laudable," the court concluded that "the instruments chosen by




Of the seven three-judge courts considering the constitution-
272. Id. Although commissioners were elected from each of three districts, they were
elected by the "electorate of the whole county." The commissioner districts in McKinney
were apparently malapportioned and could not have withstood scrutiny under Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
273. 340 F. Supp. at 295.
274. Id. State durational residency requirements in" Alabama range from 3 years for
state senator or representative to 5 years for other offices, except governor and lieutenant
governor which have 7-year residency requirements.
275. Stapleton v. City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
276. Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 968
(1971).
277. Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
278. 340 F. Supp. at 296.
279. 363 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
280. Id. at 326.
281. Id. at 326-27.
282. Id. at 327.
283. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, op-
eration or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer
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ality of durational residency requirements for public office, the
holdings of three have been summarily affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court. However, special circumstances involved
in each of these three cases make the Supreme 'Court's disposition
appropriate on grounds other than the constitutional merits.
Only two of the seven three-judge courts have invalidated the
challenged state durational residency requirements for public
office.
The first three-judge court to dispose of a challenge to dura-
tional residency requirements for public office was Hadnott v.
Amos (Hadnott i!)184 which, in dicta, and over the strong dissent
of Judge Johnson, declared that states have a "compelling state
interest in imposing a substantial pre-election residence require-
ment for circuit judges." '285 The three-judge court did "not decide
whether the period of one year is too long" since the plaintiff "has
at no time become a resident of the judicial circuit" and non-
residency is clearly sufficient to deny a candidate access to the
ballot. 8 The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Hadnott
II, thus, is precedential authority for the constitutional validity
of requirements that candidates or officeholders be bona fide resi-
dents of their electoral districts, not for the validity of durational
residency requirements.
Judge Johnson's dissent from the court's dicta with respect
to the validity of durational residency requirements for the office
of judge was premised on his solicitude for the "constitutionally
protected right [of qualified citizens] to vote and to have their
votes counted."2 7 He reasoned that the "right of the candidate
to seek public office is . . .so inextricably intertwined with the
right of the voter to vote effectively that an infringement on one
of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the uncon-
stitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and deter-
mined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
For comprehensive treatment of the history and role of three-judge courts, see HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 967 (P. Bator, P. Meshkin, D.
Shapiro & H. Wechsler ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER] and R. STERN
& E. GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (1969).
284. 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 968 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as IADNOIT II].
285. Id. at 119.
286. Id. Accord, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 636-37 (1969).
287. 320 F. Supp. at 127 (Johnson, J., dissenting and concurring).
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right will necessarily have a deleterious effect on the other."' ,
Durational residency requirements in a judicial district make no
sense when there are no comparable requirements for equally
sensitive positions such as county sheriff and when the chief jus-
tice of the state supreme court regularly assigns circuit judges to
circuits in which they have never resided.28 Other safeguards are
sufficient to protect the voters from dishonest candidates. For
example, judges must be members of the Alabama Bar and
"must have satisfied the strict standards of the Bar's ethics com-
mittee. 12 91 Second, most judicial candidates "will have been
nominated by an established political party which will. . . have
screened the candidate before nominating him. ' 291 Third, the
election process itself provides sufficient safeguards to protect
legitimate state interests. Opponents will be "only too pleased to
publicize the fact that the candidate is a 'stranger' to the com-
munity" and the local media will be "only too willing to 'expose'
.. .unfit [candidates]. ' '292 Judge Johnson also objected to the
durational residency requirement because it established a "non-
rebuttable presumption" which is "unsupportable" in fact.93
In Mogk v. City of Detroit 194 the three-judge court unani-
mously invalidated a Michigan law imposing a 3-year durational
residency requirement on candidates for members of charter revi-
sion commissions. 2 5 The court declined to dismiss for mootness
because the "'problem is capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view and the need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing
controversy in the federal-state area.' ",28 The court questioned
the continuing validity of Snowden v. Hughes29 and Pope v.
Williams298 on which the defendants relied, stating that "vast
changes have taken place in our way of living between the turn
288. Id. at 128.
289. Id. at 128-29.
290. Id. at 129.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 129-30.
293. Id. at 130.
294. 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
295. During the pendency of the proceeding, the primary election was held and Mogk
was defeated. Plaintiffs, as voters, thereafter amended their complaint to seek declaratory
relief.
296. 335 F. Supp. at 699.
297. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
298. 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
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of the century and 1971."250 The three-judge court found the 3-
year durational residency requirement for membership on charter
commissions unjustifiable in the context of the divergent dura-
tional residency requirements imposed on other state officers."'
The great differences between durational residency requirements
among officers of comparable responsibility and for the same of-
fices over time provide little support for the rationality of such
requirements. The Mogk court believed that the right to be a
candidate was "inextricably intertwined" with the right to
vote-that "a citizen has a right to vote effectively and . . . to
support a candidate of his choice-including himself."rsl The
court saw a "strange inconsistency" in the fact that a voter could
move intrastate to a community in Michigan and vote in a
charter election after 30-days durational residency. The court
asked: "Does this mean that voters can learn in thirty days what
a, prospective candidate can learn in not less than three years?"'s 2
Moreover, the court challenged the tenuous assumption that
mere residence in a community makes a person "more aware of
its problems" or possessed of "better solutions" to community
problems.3 The court additionally questioned, "[W]ho is to say
that a late arrival in the community is not best qualified to fill
the office here in question?", noting that the "problems of one
large city are basically no different from the problems of an-
other.""3 4 The court admitted that a durational residency require-
ment for public office may have been rational in 1909 when the
"rurally-oriented legislature conceived of cities as larger towns
.. .in which most of the inhabitants knew each other."s A 3-
year durational residency requirement, however, "has neither
299. 335 F. Supp. at 699.
300. When Mogk was decided, Michigan required only a 6-month residency for
voting. A 2-year residency had been required for governor and lieutenant governor by the
state constitutions of 1835, 1850 and 1908, but the 1963 constitution increased the resi-
dency requirement to 4 years. The Michigan secretary of state and attorney general are
in the line of gubernatorial succession but the residential requirement for both offices is
only 6 months. All other offices in the state require only a 6 month residency, whether
township or state wide, legislative or judicial. And, of course, no state durational residency
is required for election to the United States Senate or House of Representatives from
Michigan. Id. at 699-700.




305. Id. at 701.
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logic, reason nor experience to support it" in the contemporary
urban context in which "tenants in a high-rise. . . building know
very few of their fellow tenants, and . . . even in single-family
dwelling neighborhoods, acquaintanceship rarely encompasses
more than persons living within the city block." '
In Draper v. Phelps,"7 the three-judge court upheld the va-
lidity of a 6-month, legislative district durational residency re-
quirement for membership in the Oklahoma House of Represent-
atives. The Draper court adopted the strict scrutiny standard and
proceeded to apply the Dunn30 s equal protection formulae ad-
vanced by Mr. Justice Marshall. However, the court did not agree
with the contention that Dunn's holding on voting rights was
dispositive of the asserted right of candidacy in Draper .3 1 The
Draper court asserted that it is "irrefutable that the likelihood of
harm to the state interest is greater at the candidacy level than
at the voter level." ' But this factor would be relevant only if
there were a clearly demonstrable relationship between candidate
ability and durational residency-a relationship often asserted
but never proved.
The Draper court posited a "compelling [state] interest in
preventing frivolous and fraudulent candidacy . "... ,311 But this
admittedly compelling interest can be protected by means less
intrusive upon the rights of voting, candidacy and travel."' Dura-
tional residency requirements discourage some candidacies which
are neither frivolous nor fraudulent. Moreover, the state interest
in discouraging frivolous or fraudulent candidacies is far better
served by devices other than durational residency requirements.
The Draper court asserted that the state has a "compelling
interest in requiring that those who expect to stand for. . . office
. ..take the matter seriously and make plans for their candidacy
in advance of the election date. '313 Here, too, the weakness of the
306. Id.
307. 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
308. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
309. The "right to form political parties" under Williams and the "right of suffrage"
under Dunn were declared "not [to] relate to impositions upon the right of candidacy."
351 F. Supp. at 680 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 682.
311. Id. at 683.
312. See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 402 U.S. 431 (1971).
313. 351 F. Supp. at 683.
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Draper court's position arises from the absence of proof of a rela-
tionship between the asserted state interest and the means cho-
sen to effectuate the interest-in this instance, between a well-
planned campaign and durational residency of the prescribed
length. The court did not demonstrate that residency is essential
to the early planning stages of a political campaign or that a well-
planned legislative campaign can not be executed in less than 6
months, apparently failing to consider the fact that most success-
ful political campaigns today peak in the weeks immediately pre-
ceeding the election. Moreover, it is plain that durational resi-
dency requirements for public office, in and of themselves, do not
advance the state interest in well-planned, serious campaigns.
Relying extensively upon the Hadnott II decision that dura-
tional residency requirements are essential to allow "personal
contacts" between candidates and voters," the Draper court
again failed to identify a necessary relationship between "voter
contacts" and length of residency. Candidates with less time in
the community may be more inclined to operate a highly person-
alized campaign, in part to overcome their lack of previous con-
tacts. However, personalized political campaigns-for better or
worse-have been undermined by the effectiveness of mass media
technology. Draper and Hadnott II assume that personalized
campaigns are essential in rural areas where there is allegedly a
"paucity of television and radio stations and a lack of daily news-
papers. '"315 One must question whether, in fact, there remain
areas of this country not served by television, radio and newspa-
pers. If there be such areas, the personalized campaign would be
an exigency of political life, and legal reinforcement through du-
rational residency requirements would appear superfluous.
Whether there exists a legitimate state interest in affording
voters the opportunity to acquire knowledge of the reputation of
candidates in a nonpolitical, precampaign context is a more diffi-
cult problem. Such an interest was implied in Draper, Hadnott
II, and in the dissent in Thompson .31 This, perhaps, is the one
state interest which can be served only by a durational residency
requirement in excess of the probable campaign time frame. Ab-
sent a durational residency requirement, it is possible that voters
would not know the candidate, except in a political context in
314. Id. at 683-85.
315. See notes 182-87 and accompanying text supra.
316. Id. at 685.
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which the candidate's "true-self," presumably, could be con-
cealed. Here, there is assuredly a rational relationship between
the asserted state interest and the means chosen to implement
that interest. At this point, it may be necessary to decide
"whether the interest promoted by limiting the franchise consti-
tutes a compelling state interest." '317 Unless the state interest in
exposing voters to an opportunity to acquire knowledge of a pro-
spective candidate's personal reputation in advance of the cam-
paign is a compelling interest, it could not override the presuma-
bly compelling interests in the right to vote, to be a candidate or
to travel. In any event, the balance should be struck in favor of
the right to be a candidate. The ballot box provides an adequate
remedy for any voter who doubts the integrity of or lacks suffi-
cient knowledge regarding the reputation of a particular candi-
date.
The Draper court distinguished Mogk,315 Green"' and
McKinney32 because those cases involved durational residencies
of 3, 2 and 5 years in contrast to Oklahoma's 6-month durational
residency for the state House of Representatives. Draper relied on
the Missouri court's approval of the 1-year durational residency
for state senator in Gralike32'l and on New Mexico's approval of a
filing fee of 6 percent of the first year's salary as a requirement
of candidacy, 22 a holding of dubious authority after Lubin v.
Panish2 13 The court also pointed to the fact that "[c]ounsel have
not directed attention to any reported case in which a candidacy
requirement of six months for those who covet election to state
office has been held violative of the Equal Protection of the
Law.,
32A
In Walker v. Yucht 3 5 the court applied the reasonable basis
317. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.14 (1969).
318. See notes 294-306 and accompanying text supra.
319. See notes 237-51 and accompanying text supra.
320. See notes 266-78 and accompanying text supra.
321. See notes 205-07 and accompanying text supra.
322. See State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 83 N.M. 663, 495 P.2d 1379 (1972).
323. 415 U.S. 709 (1974). In Lubin the Supreme Court held that
in the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not,
consistent with constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate
filing fees he cannot pay.
Id. at 718.
324. Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677, 686 (W.D. Okla. 1972). Draper was decided
before Thompson v. Mellon, which would have provided at least dictum for the requested
authority. See notes 162-87 and accompanying text supra.
325. 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972).
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test in upholding the validity of a 3-year state durational resi-
dency requirement for public office. Unlike Hadnott II, Mogk and
Draper which involved intrastate migration only, Walker clearly
involved the right of interstate migration, the plaintiff having
moved to Delaware from Georgia less than 3 years prior to the
election. The plaintiff in Walker won his political party's primary
although he had lived in Delaware for only 17 months. The ques-
tion of whether, under these circumstances, the case was moot
was not before the district court since the court's decision was
rendered from the bench on the day of argument when the contro-
versy involving plaintiff was "clearly 'live.' ",326 The Walker court
narrowly construed the Supreme Court 'holding in Turner3 27 as
pivoting upon "the nature of the criterion by which the state
chose to classify-property ownership-not from the nature of the
particular interest burdened-political candidacy. "328 The
Walker court felt that its position was consistent with a careful
reading of Bullock.23 The Walker court concludes, as does this
writer, that the appropriate analysis is, consistent with Bullock,
to "'examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of [the]
impact on voters' ,,0 of such requirements.
The Walker court examined the relationship between voting
and candidacy and distinguished Harper331 and Dunn33P2 from the
factual situation in Walker because in both Harper and Dunn
"the state denies, completely, the right to vote to those failing to
fulfill a prescribed condition-payment of a fee or length of resi-
dency. ' '3 3 In contrast, what is "directly restricted here is essen-
tially candidacy, not voting. '34 However, the Walker court's in-
terpretation of Dunn appears far too restrictive when one consid-
ers the reciprocal relationship between voting and candidacy. For
326. Id. at 88 n.3.
327. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). See note 85 and accompanying text
supra.
328. 352 F. Supp. at 90 (emphasis in original).
329. The court quotes Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 142.43 (1972), stating that" 'the Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental
status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review,'. . . and. . . that '[the]
existence of [candidacy] barriers does not of itself compel close scrutiny.'" 352 F. Supp.
at 90.
330. 352 F. Supp. at 91, quoting Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
331. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
332. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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example, voting rights established by Harper33' 5 were soon applied
to candidacy in Bullock and Lubin. The court in Walker erro-
neously restricted the Williams v. Rhodes33 decision to those situ-
ations involving "the right to vote 'effectively,' -337 and ignored
the right of candidacy established by that decision. The court
recognized that "the right to vote effectively is [not] burdened,
in any constitutionally relevant sense, by all candidacy restric-
tions, '338 but the weakness of its rationale results in part from a
failure to explore durational residency requirements in the con-
text of Williams' "right to vote effectively." It did not engage in
the deliberative reasoning demanded by Bullock 33 but concluded
"simply, that . . . the 'right to vote effectively' . . . does not
mean. . . what the plaintiff asserts. ' 4 The only support for this
conclusion was that durational residency requirements prejudice
"no discrete class of voters. '341 The court asserted that the impact
of durational residency requirements for public office is "unre-
lated to the wealth of the aspiring candidate or that of the voters
supporting him," and was, thus, "[u]nlike Bullock."
3
1'
The alleged economic and ethnic heterogeneity of migrants
is misleading.34 3 In fact, the "movers" comprise discrete sub-
groups, among which are included poor, rural, Southern blacks
moving to urban areas in the South, North and West; poor South-
ern urban blacks moving to the urban North and West; and poor
Southern whites moving to the urban North and West. Jesse
Walker's migration from Georgia to Delaware presents the prob-
lem in economic and ethnic terms similar to the context in which
the Walker court interpreted Bullock-namely, as "merely a new
application of the general axiom that statutory arrangements col-
335. In Harper the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause forbids states
from placing a price tag on the right to vote.
336. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In Williams the Supreme Court struck down Ohio's election
laws under the fourteenth amendment concluding that
the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of
rights-the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion,
to cast their votes effectively.
393 U.S. at 30.
337. 352 F. Supp. at 92.
338. Id.
339. See note 329 and accompanying text supra.
340. 352 F. Supp. at 92.
341. Id. at 93.
342. Id.
343. See notes 125-37 and accompanying text supra.
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liding with the right to vote in such way as to burden the voting
power of discrete minority groups must be closely scrutinized."-,
The Walker court's conclusion that the issue is one of "deter-
mining who should make the adjustment"-popularly elected
legislative bodies or federal courts which as "non-representative
bodies . . . do not, and are not designed to, reflect democratic
society. '" 31 The persuasiveness of the rational basis standard of
review depends upon alternative access of adversely affected in-
terests to the legislative process. However, the absolute barrier to
the political candidacy of those not satisfying durational resi-
dency requirements for public office blocks a vital means of the
affected group's access to the legislative process. The inhibition
on political association coupled with limited access to the politi-
cal process suggests the need for correspondingly more searching
judicial scrutiny of durational residency requirements for public
office.
The Walker court expressed a "disinclination to accept a
reading of Dunn that would strike down all state statutes 'penal-
izing,' no matter how slightly, the right to travel interstate. 346
But the invalidation of durational residency requirements for
public office is a logical extension of Dunn and would in no way
strike down all state durational residency statutes affecting sub-
stantially different state interests such as divorce or hunting and
fishing licenses. Nor does the willingness of the Supreme Court
to approve a 30 or 50-day durational residency for voting when
justified by legitimate state administrative interests afford any
support whatever for the validity of a 3-year requirement as the
Walker court implied. 47 The "candidate knowledge" '348 and "voter
exposure ' 39 interests were considered rationally related to legiti-
mate state goals, although they admittedly produced a classifica-
tion "both underinclusive and overinclusive. ' ' 35 ° But the court
suggested that state classification is "not unconstitutional under
the traditional equal protection test merely because it is not 'right
on target.' "31
344. 352 F. Supp. at 93.
345. Id. at 99 (emphasis in original).
346. Id. at 97.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 98.
349. Id.
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The Walker court's holding seems especially inconsistent
with recent decisions in Bullock and Lubin. It is unwarranted to
construe Lubin as narrowly as the Walker court did, since such a
construction plainly contradicts the Lubin court's apparent con-
cern with prohibitive candidate qualifications which "do not, in
and of themselves, test the genuineness of a candidacy or the
extent of voter support of an aspirant for public office." '352 Dura-
tional residency requirements for public office are constitution-
ally very similar to prohibitive filing fees because they "can effec-
tively exclude serious candidates. ' ' 1 3 Durational residency re-
quirements for public office also share the vice of prohibitive
filing fees in that they are an absolute barrier to some aspirants
who are denied "any alternative means of gaining access to the
ballots."
3 154
In Chimento v. Stark355 a three-judge district court upheld a
7-year durational residency requirement of the New Hampshire
state constitution for the office of governor. The critical factor in
Chimento was that plaintiff's name appeared on the ballot in his
party's primary where he failed to obtain the nomination. The
plaintiff then decided to run as an independent and the Secretary
of State declined to accept his filing papers as an independent
candidate. There were adequate alternative, independent state
grounds to justify exclusion of Chimento from the 1972 New
Hampshire general election ballot. (1) States have a legitimate
interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral system by
excluding defeated primary candidates such as Chimento from
running as independents in the general election. 56 (2) Chimento's
declared intention to run in the 1974 election was not ripe and
could not properly have been considered,35 7 although the state
indicated it would not allow Chimento to file in 1974 since he
would still not have met the 7-year residency requirement.355
The Chimento court concluded that a 7-year durational resi-
dency requirement was only "a minimal infringement upon the
ability of the plaintiff to participate in the election process...
352. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717 (1974).
353. Id. at 718.
354. Id.
355. 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973).
356. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
357. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
358. 353 F. Supp. at 1213.
1976]
61
Le Clercq: Durational Residency Requirements for Public Office
Published by Scholar Commons, 1976
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[since it only] delays . . .eligibility . . . [and] is not a con-
plete barrier.""3 9 Although some minimal durational residency
requirement for public office may be consistent with legitimate
state interests, the approval of a 7-year requirement appears to
impose an altogether intolerable and unreasonable burden upon
voting rights and the right to be a candidate. The fact that the
durational residency requirement for governor of New Hampshire
dated from "the very beginning of this nation [,] . . .goes back
to 1784 and was never challenged until now,""36 obviously influ-
enced the court's holding. But the traditional argument is no
stronger as applied to durational residency for public office than
other archaic but recently challenged electoral practices concern-
ing voting, filing fees for candidacy, legislative apportionment,
and property restrictions on suffrage. Long continued practice,
alone, affords no proof of rationality. The state interests allegedly
served by the 7-year durational residency requirement were the
"knowledgeable candidate" and "voter exposure" interests. The
three-judge court also concluded that the relationship between
the residency requirement and the right to travel was too "indi-
rect and remote . . .[and] far too attenuated" to constitute an
infringement on the right to travel. 6' In approving a 7-year dura-
tional residency requirement, the Chimento court is seriously out
of step with the recent trend of state and federal jurisprudence.
Although Chimento ostensibly applied the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the court's opinion lacks the careful balancing of interests
contemplated by Kramer6 2 and Dunn.363
In Headlee v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections64 the three-
judge court invalidated a 1-year city durational residency require-
ment for public office in the village of Dublin, Ohio, thereby
allowing plaintiff to occupy the seat she had won in a recent
municipal election. In Headlee, plaintiff had not moved to, but
lived on, land annexed to the village less than 1 year prior to the
village election. Thus, the three-judge court's decision could not
have been predicated on the right to travel since annexation of
additional land by municipal corporations can hardly be said to
359. Id. at 1215-16.
360. Id. at 1216-17.
361. Id. at 1218.
362. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
363. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
364. 368 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
[Vol. 27
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irivolve a right to travel. However, the three-judge court con-
cluded that strict scrutiny of the challenged exclusion was appro-
priate because of the adverse impact of the candidate residency
requirement on the exercise of the franchise.365 The court believed
that the challenged residency requirement infringed first amend-
ment freedoms of expression and association and "unnecessarily
restrict[ed] voter choice." 30 The state asserted an allegedly
compelling interest in "preventing frivolous, fraudulent or un-
qualified candidacies for election,13 7 but the court concluded
that the means of regulation were fatally overinclusive and under-
inclusive in that they "exclud[ed] both legitimate as well as
frivolous candidates . . . [and] fail[ed] to insure that only
qualified candidates seek public office. 36 8 The court premised its
decision on the ethical norm that whether a candidate has "the
necessary skill and knowledge of the community is a question
ultimately for the voters to decide.
'369
On September 24, 1974-only 1 day after the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Ravenel-the complaint in
Kanapaux v. Ellisor3 70 was filed in federal district court by a voter
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement
of the 5-year durational residency requirement for governor on
federal constitutional grounds.3 7' A three-judge court denied re-
lief, 372 and the United States Supreme Court summarily
affirmed.31 3 Kanapaux provides no more authority for the validity
of durational residency requirements for public office than do
Chimento374 or Hadnott II.311 The court in Kanapaux thought that





370. Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 1974), affd mem., 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
371. Complaint at § 12(e), Kanapaux v. Ellisor, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept. 26,
1974), afl'd mem., 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
372. The three-judge court in Kanapaux convened and granted an expedited hearing
on September 26, 1974 due to the "importance of time in relation to the electoral process
of the State of South Carolina." The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon
the grounds that the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 art. IV, § 2, was not repugnant
to the federal constitution and was justified by a "compelling state interest." The court
treated defendant's motion as one for summary judgment and in a brief order granted
summary judgment to defendants.
373. 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
374. See notes 355-63 and accompanying text supra.
375. See notes 284-93 and accompanying text supra.
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the Supreme Court's summary affirimance of Chimento was "sub-
stantially conclusive" of the issue before it. 31s The district court
declared that the 5-year requirement was reasonable since its
"impact is not to say he [Ravenel] cannot serve in the . . .
highest office; it simply means he may not serve now."3 7 The
deferred time frame within which the district court measured the
impact of durational residency requirements for public office is
inconsistent with Williams '7 and ignores the critical existential
significance of time in a political context. The district court at-
tempted to justify the 5-year durational residency requirement on
the ground that "an able man with a winning way about him can
move from one place to another when he had a bad reputation in
the place he came from, [and] it sometimes takes quite some
time for that reputation to catch up with him. 3 ' 9 Although dura-
tional residency requirements may serve that state interest in a
crude way, the state interest might be equally served by a require-
ment far less restrictive than 5 years. The 5-year requirement is
unacceptable because it is not precisely tailored to achieve the
asserted state interest in a manner least disruptive of fundamen-
tal political and associational rights. The district court's decision
in Kanapaux, however, can be justified on other grounds. Rave-
nel's failure to assert his federal claims in Ravenel v. Dekle85
could properly be regarded as a waiver of those claims,3 1 as the
state attorney general argued.8 '
The abstention cases help illuminate the fatal legal errors
376. Order at 1(a), Kanapaux v. Ellisor, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 1974),
aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 891 (1974). The district court concluded that the 5-year durational
residency requirement was not unconstitutional because of "the guidance that we get from
what the Supreme Court has said, and because they did so recently, and on the merits of
the case itself." Id. at 3(a).
377. Id. at 2(a) (emphasis added).
378. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
379. Order at 2(a), Kanapaux v. Ellisor, Civil No. 74-1356 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 1974),
aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
380. 265 S.C. 364, 218 S.E.2d 521 (1975).
381. See note 223 and accompanying text supra.
382. The state attorney general contended in the Supreme Court:
the opportunity to assert such [federal] claims was expressly afforded by the
[South Carolina Supreme] Court but Ravenel elected not to pursue them
.... Neither he nor any other voter supporting his candidacy should now be
heard to complain about the alleged unconstitutionality of South Carolina's
gubernatorial durational residency requirement.
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made in Ravenel v. Dekle and the deficiencies of the federal com-
plaint in Kanapaux. The failure to apprise a state court of a
claimed federal right, so that -the state court may render a deci-
sion upon state law in the light of the federal claim, precludes
subsequent assertion of the federal right in the federal courts.3
In Government & Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO,
v. Windsor384 the Supreme Court vacated a district court decision
because the
bare adjudication by the Alabama Supreme Court... does not
suffice, since that court was not asked to interpret the statute
in light of the constitutional objections presented to the District
Court. If appellants' freedom of expression and equal protection
arguments had been presented to the state court, it might have
construed the statute in a different manner. 5
The Missouri Court's construction of the 10-year durational
residency requirement for governor in Missouri ex rel. King v.
Walsh,386 in the light of the federal constitutional issues, strongly
suggests the vitality of the Windsor court's logic. Where a party
"selects to seek a complete and final adjudication of his rights in
the state courts," '387 as Ravenel did in Ravenel v. Dekle, then
jurisdiction of the federal district court to hear federal questions
would be "purely formal,"3 and federal review is cognizable in
the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction "to review directly...
[a] final state court judgment." '389 The only way to preserve a
right to litigate a federal claim in the district court subsequent
to a final judgment by a state court of last resort is by
making on the state record the "reservation to the disposition
of the entire case by the state courts." . . . That is, he may
inform the state courts that he is exposing his federal claims
there only for the purpose of complying with Windsor, and that
he intends, should the state courts hold against him on the
question of state law, to return to the District Court for disposi-
tion of his federal contentions. 9
383. See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353
U.S. 364, 366 (1957).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See notes 208-14 and accompanying text supra.
387. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963).
388. Id.
389. Id.
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In the absence of such a reservation by Ravenel in Ravenel v.
Dekle, it would have been proper for the federal district court in
Kanapaux to have dismissed the complaint upon Windsor
grounds. Ravenel's failure to make the reservation in Ravenel v.
Dekle, or to assert his federal claims and seek direct review in the
Supreme Court, in effect, made Ravenel v. Dekle res judicata
with respect to Ravenel's federal claims. 9'
The summary affirmance by the Supreme Court in
Kanapaux could also have been compelled by the mootness doc-
trine. Application of that doctrine to election cases is not new.1
2
Upon the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Ravenel v. Dekle, Ravenel became "otherwise. . . disqualified"
within the meaning of South Carolina law,393 thereby authorizing
the state Democratic executive committee to fill the vacancy.
Whatever federal claims Ravenel could have asserted to remain
on the ballot were thereby mooted, since there is no federal con-
stitutional right to nomination of candidates for public office by
a primary election; selection of party nominees by democratically
constituted conventions or state party executive committees is
constitutionally sufficient.
Consideration of comity and federalism may also explain the
391. Voters unquestionably have standing to assert the rights of a candidate to ballot
access. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); HAMr & WECHSLER at 184 (1973).
Williams is distinguishable from Kanapaux in that Governor Wallace did not waive his
federal claims.
392. See, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) and Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969). But cf. the "capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine of Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2. (1972) and Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969).
393. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-266 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
If a party nominee dies, withdraws or otherwise becomes disqualified after his
nomination and sufficient time does not remain to hold a convention or primary
to fill the vacancy or to nominate a nominee to enter a special election, the
respective State or county party executive committee may nominate a nominee
for such office, who shall be duly certified by the respective county or State
chairman. Provided, that where such a party nominee is unopposed each politi-
cal party registered with the Secretary of State shall have the privilege of nomi-
nating a candidate for the office involved. If the event occurs forty-five days or
more prior to the election such nomination must be certified not less than thirty
days prior to the election. If the event occurs less than forty-five days prior to
the election such office shall not be voted on until the first Tuesday in the month
following such election and such nomination must be certified not less than
fifteen days prior thereto.
Rep. W.J. Bryan Dorn, whom Ravenel had beaten in the primary, became the Democratic
nominee for governor of South Carolina. He subsequently lost the general election to the
Republican nominee, James Edwards, who became the first Republican governor of South
Carolina in this century.
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Court's summary affirmance of Kanapaux. Comity involves "a
proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made of a Union of separate state govern-
ments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Govern-
ment will fare best if the states and their institutions are left free
to perform their separate functions. . . ."" The concept of "Our
Federalism" presupposes a "sensitivity to the legitimate interests
of both State and National Governments, and in which the Na-
tional Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States." '395 The doctrine of equitable restraint
developed in Younger and reflecting federal reluctance to inter-
vene in a historically recognized state sphere of interest-
criminal prosecution-is, likewise, applicable to federal judicial
intervention in the state electoral process. Writing for the
Court in Oregon v. Mitchell,396 Mr. Justice Black observed that
"[n]o function is more essential to the separate and independent
existence of the States and their governments than the power to
determine. . . the nature of their machinery for filling local pub-
lic offices." '97 State power over state elections, although admit-
tedly very great,3 8 is nonetheless subject to considerable federal
regulation as this writer has attempted to point out. State power
over state elections, however, is limited only by forms of discrimi-
nation prohibited by the constitution.
The state interest in the stability of its electoral process is
quite substantial. 399 Federal judicial policy in election cases is
strongly influenced by the concern that court orders should not
have "a serious disruptive effect" upon the election process.4 °°
394. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Courts of equity have traditionally
shown less reluctance to intervene in civil cases than in criminal cases since the "offense
to state interests is likely to be less in a civil proceeding." Id. at 55 n.2 (Stewart, J., joined
by Harlan, J., concurring).
395. 401 U.S. at 55 n.2 (Stewart, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurring). Since the
"offense to state interests is likely to be less in a civil proceeding," the equitable restraint
called for may be less than in criminal cases. Id.
396. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
397. Id. at 156.
398. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy
requirement on suffrage upheld).
399. See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) and Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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The Court wishes to avoid "the confusion that would attend...
a last-minute change [which] poses a risk of interference with
the rights of other . . citizens, for example, absentee voters."4 '
The closer the decision is to the election the greater must be the
courts' concern for the "extremely difficult . . . [state burden]
to provide still another set of ballots."4"2 Election cases often
strain judicial resources sorely because they leave too little oper-
ating time for the multifarious time limits and time consuming
functions of the judicial process.
It would be difficult to conceive of a more serious disruption
of the state electoral process than the South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Ravenel. Had Ravenel asserted his federal
claims in the state court, he would have had a right to Supreme
Court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. There would have been
adequate time for docketing an appeal, oral argument and a deci-
sion on the merits, especially in view of the fact that state law
fortuitously provided for a month extension of the election when
the disqualifying event occurs within 45 days of the election, as
it did in Ravenel. °3 Once a successor was lawfully nominated by
the state executive committee and certified by the state chair-
man, a federal decree granting the relief sought in Kanapaux may
have had a serious disruptive effect upon the state electoral pro-
cess. Federal intervention would appear especially inappropriate
in view of Ravenel's stipulation in the state court limiting his
claims to state issues and thereby waiving his federal claims. In
contrast, had Ravenel asserted his federal claims in a timely
manner, the United States Supreme Court could have reached
the merits of his claim on appeal from the state supreme court
without serious disruption of the electoral process.
CONCLUSION
Durational residency requirements for public office signifi-
cantly dilute fundamental rights which deserve, and have re-
ceived, judicial protection: the right to vote, the right of political
association and the right to travel. Such requirements can and
should be invalidated whenever they interfere with the exercise
of these fundamental constitutional rights. The states are better
401. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1968).
402. Id.
403. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
[Vol. 27
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served by directing their attention to the prevention of electoral
fraud and campaign "dirty tricks" than to restricting access to
the ballot for new residents.
The proscription of lengthy durational residency require-
ments would not jeopardize the states' "legitimate interest in
regulating the number of candidates on the ballot.""4 3 The state
interest, if not the state duty, "to protect the integrity of its
political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidates
0 4
would not be compromised. The legitimate state interest in "the
stability of its political system" and the integrity of its primary
elections and political party system"' would remain inviolate.
There may be no need for the Supreme Court to invalidate
residency requirements for public office per se, since the substan-
tiality of the constitutional claim generally varies with the length
of durational residency required. The type of public office may
also be relevant to the length of acceptable durational residency
requirements. At the threshhold level-for example, 50 days or
less-the constitutional claims against durational residency re-
quirements may be de minimis since most serious candidates
would meet such minimal requirements.10
Just as the Court's decision invalidating the patently exces-
sive filing fees in Bullock was not dispositive of a challenge to the
more modest fees in Lubin, a decision invalidating a 5 or 7-year
durational residency requirement for public office would not be
dispositive of challenges to far less restrictive requirements-for
example, the 6-month durational residency requirement for
membership in the Oklahoma House of Representatives recently
upheld by a three-judge federal court."7 The states have a
compelling interest in obtaining the names of candidates in suffi-
cient time to accommodate the printing and distribution of bal-
lots. The states also have a substantial interest in the residency
of the candidate during the brief time preceding the election rea-
404. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
405. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 714, 736 (1974). Approval by the Court of the 1-year
disaffiliation provision in Storer does not provide authority for the constitutionality of
durational residency requirements for public office because the 1-year waiting period in
Storer was "expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity ?f the
various routes to the ballot"-not with a blanket exclusion from the ballot. Id. at 733
(emphasis added).
406. Consider, however, the case of the returning veteran or college graduate who may
not even satisfy a 90-day durational residency requirement for candidacy.
407. Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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sonably necessary for the conduct of a political campaign. Any
additional durational residency should be closely scrutinized be-
cause of its adverse consequences on voting rights and the asso-
ciational rights of prospective candidates."'
Two factors are relevant to the validity of a durational resi-
dency requirement-its length and the character of the right or
privilege affected. In Sosna the Court affirmed the validity of a
1-year state durational residency requirement as a condition pre-
cedent to filing for divorce. Conversely, the Court has invalidated
1-year state durational residency requirements for welfare
(Shapiro), voting (Dunn) and medical services (Maricopa
County). The length of a durational residency requirement is a
critical factor in determining its validity because length has a
significant impact on the severity of the penalty on the burdened
substantive right and on the right to travel. Thus, considerations
which led the Supreme Court to uphold the validity of the 1-year
durational residency requirement in Sosna may well be insuffi-
cient to uphold the validity of a 2-year state durational residency
requirement for divorce. 9 The character of the right or privilege
burdened by a durational residency requirement is equally impor-
tant. Judicial acceptance of the reasonableness of 1-year dura-
tional residency requirements for divorce is hardly persuasive re-
garding the validity of similar requirements for political candi-
dacy. A penalty on the right to travel affecting access to the
courts in divorce actions may be offset by countervailing legiti-
mate state interests not present in cases involving political rights,
welfare or medical services.
Recent litigation contains important messages for legal coun-
sel in election cases. Federal rights can be waived by candidates.
The timely assertion of claims may be essential to avoid moot-
ness, yet claims will not be entertained until ripe. The federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal challenges to the
validity of durational residency requirements for public office
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). Absent
a lack of clarity in state law sufficient to support federal absten-
tion, counsel can elect between state or federal forums. The Rave-
408. Compare Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) and Martson v. Lewis, 410 U.S.
675 (1973), with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
714 (1974), and Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
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nel candidacy in South Carolina demonstrates the folly of the
expenditure of large sums of money or the equally immense in-
volvement of the time and energy of thousands of supporters with
a legal cloud hanging over a political candidacy.
The impact of durational residency requirements for public
office is obviously sufficient to evoke strict scrutiny. It is difficult
to imagine a law with a more devastating impact on the political
process than one which denies ballot access to the gubernatorial
nominee of a major political party democratically elected by
thousands of state voters. Strict scrutiny of durational residency
requirements for public office in excess of 1 or 2 years may not
be necessary since such laws may fail to satisfy even the less
stringent, reasonable basis test. The more demanding test should
be employed, nevertheless.
The preferred and most effective means of limiting access to
public office in a democratic system is the ballot box. Whenever
durational residency requirements for public office interfere sub-
stantially with the right of the people to vote for candidates of
their choice, then such requirements are incompatible with dem-
ocratic government and inconsistent with equal protection of the
laws. The absence of state durational residency requirements for
the United States Senate and House of Representatives for the
past 184 years should offer sufficient proof that such requirements
do not serve a compelling governmental interest. When the Su-
preme Court eventually gives plenary consideration to a case in-
volving the constitutionality of durational residency require-
ments, it would do well to recall Hamilton's words "that the
people should choose whom they please to govern them."4 ' As
Madison observed at the Constitutional Convention, "this princi-
ple is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can
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